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Abstract
I construct a model in which a colony trades raw materials for manufactures with the
mother country and the rest of the world, and can rebel at the cost of some trade disruption
with the mother country. Decolonisation is more likely when the rest of the world is more
abundant in manufactures, or scarcer in raw materials: this is because trade policy in the
rest of the world is more favourable to a rebel colony, while trade policy within the empire
is more restrictive. I use my results to explain the timing of the American Revolution, and
the Latin American Revolutionary Wars. I discuss some important implications for the
history of colonialism.
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1 Introduction
When France lost land-abundant Canada and Louisiana in the Seven Years’ War (1763), her
remaining North American empire became scarcer in food. As a consequence, French trade
policy became more open to foreign producers of food, such as the colonial USA. A few years
later, in 1776, a coalition of US colonies found that the time was right to rebel against Britain.
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From a trade perspective, they were right: although rebellion brought upon them the cost of
British sanctions - which damaged their exports to the British Empire - buoyant exports to the
French and other European empires helped them to recover soon after the revolution. These
facts suggest that the change of endowments of 1763, and the resulting change in trade policy,
created a favourable global environment for the American Revolution. Given the importance of
trade for the revolutionaries, this may well help to explain the timing of the revolution.
In this paper, I set up a model that clarifies the forces linking endowments, trade policy, and
colonial rebellion. A colony (CM) trades “raw materials” for “manufactures” with the mother
country (M) and a foreign country (F ), which has its own colony (CF ). Two key parameters
shape the pattern of trade: the relative abundance of raw materials in CF versus CM , denoted
by θ, and the relative abundance of manufactures in F versus M , denoted by δ. If θ is high, or
if δ is low, then F ’s empire is a competitor of CM in selling raw materials to M ; otherwise, it is
a competitor of M in buying raw materials from CM .
In M and F , trade policy is set to maximise national welfare, while in CM and CF it is set by
M and F to maximise their own welfare. However, M cannot treat CM too harshly, since this
colony can stage a successful revolution. Crucially, revolution entails a trade cost for CM , since
it is assumed to disrupt trade between CM and M . In equilibrium, the size of this cost depends
on F ’s trade policy. In this environment, the attractiveness of revolution come to depend on
M ’s trade policy before a revolution, and on F ’s trade policy after a revolution.
I show that there are two global environments that CM can find herself in. First, if θ
is high (CF is relatively abundant in raw materials), or if δ is low (F is relatively scarce in
manufactures), F ’s trade policy is hostile towards a rebel colony, since it accommodates the
interests of its imperial net sellers of raw materials (who are competitors of net sellers located
in CM). In addition, trade between CM and F is not very important in this case, and M does
not wish to impose strong trade restrictions upon CM . This implies that CM finds herself well
integrated in world trade before a revolution, but isolated after, making revolution unattractive.
Second, when θ is low or when δ is high, F ’s trade policy is friendly towards the rebel colony, since
it accommodates the interests of its net buyers of raw materials. Furthermore, trade between
CM and F is important in this case, and M wishes to impose strong trade restrictions. Thus,
CM finds herself isolated before a revolution, but well integrated after, making revolution more
attractive. I combine this economic mechanism with a simple political model of concessions or
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repression, and find that the probability of peaceful or violent decolonisation is larger in the
second environment than in the first.
The model admits two types of comparative statics: one looking at changes in θ, and one
looking at changes in δ. I use results in the two cases to shed light on two important historical
episodes. First, from the perspective of the colonial US, the outcome of the Seven Years’ War
can be seen as a sharp fall in θ. I show that, as predicted by the model, this generated a
favourable trade environment for revolution, and particularly so for the US colonies that most
enthusiastically supported the revolution. Second, I look at the rebellion of Latin America against
Spain and Portugal in 1808-1827. In that case, the external shock was the Industrial Revolution
in Britain (now, F ), a large increase in δ from the colonies’ perspective. I show that, following
its industrial take-off, British trade policy became more open towards foreign net sellers of raw
materials, and the cost of trade restrictions imposed by Spain and Portugal upon the Latin
American colonies increased. Both factors made rebellion a more attractive option.
The paper is related to the literature on the endogenous size of nations (Alesina and Spo-
laore, 1997; Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2000), which finds that globalisation reduces local
economic dependence, increasing the equilibrium number of countries. In a similar vein, Martin
et Al. (2008), find that more bilateral trade decreases the probability of war between countries,
while more multilateral trade increases it. I contribute to this literature by constructing a new
model of the link between endowments, global trade policy, and revolution. This allows me to
highlight the role of trade policy, and to discuss new historical episodes.1
Another related paper is Head et Al. (2010), who look at the impact of 20th century de-
colonisation on subsequent trade patterns. Their finding, that conflictual separation led to a
faster decline in trade between colonies and colonisers, is in line with my assumption of a trade
cost of revolution.3
The paper is also related to the literature on customs unions (for a survey, see Ornelas and
1In a companion paper (Bonfatti, 2011), I argue that the value of controlling trade policy in the colonies
declined in the 20th century, as the rise of intra-industry trade made colonial trade relatively less important.
That paper addresses the claim, made by some historians, that some European empires ended in the 1950s
because the colonisers lost interest in them. It is complementary to the present paper, which focuses on cases in
which the end of empire was driven by colonial rebellion.2
3On the “empire effect” on trade, see also Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008). The paper is also related to
the literature on natural resources and civil wars (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010). While this has focused on
fluctuations in world prices, I look at the role of trade patterns, for given world prices. This additional dimension
allows me to comment on the importance of foreign trade policy for secession.
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Freund, 2010). In my model, too, two countries (C and M) may form a customs union, from
which the third country is excluded. The difference is that M selects trade policy for both C
and M , and it does so to maximise its own welfare.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on trade and the economic legacy of empire
(e.g. Acemoglu et Al., 2005, Nunn, 2008), and to a historical literature on trade and war (e.g.
Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007).4
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model. Section 3 infor-
mally discusses two extensions. Section 4 contains the historical evidence. Section 5 discusses
some important implications of the paper, and concludes.
2 Baseline model
I first describe the model (Sections 2.1 and 2.2), and then solve for the equilibrium (2.3).
2.1 Trade model
This paper studies the colonial relationship between a colony, CM , and its mother country, M .
There are two other countries: a foreign country, F , and its own colony, CF . Two goods x and
y exist as endowments, and are traded and consumed. National endowments are
xC
F
= θ yC
F
= 0
xC
M
= 1− θ yCM = 0
xF = 1 yF = δ
xM = 1 yM = 1− δ,
(1)
where θ ∈ [0, 1) and δ ∈ [0, 1]. In words, M and F are abundant in y relative to their colonies. I
interpret x and y as “raw materials” and “manufactures” respectively, but they could represent
any commodity that M and F are competing to buy from, or sell to, their colonies.
Each country is inhabited by a mass of citizens, who can only differ in their endowments. I
denote by xiJ and yiJ the endowments of citizen i in country J , and assume that endowments
4Other models of colonial rebellion are Gartzke and Rohner (2011) and Grossman and Iyigun (1997). These
papers do not consider the role of trade in shaping rebellion, and are therefore very different from mine.
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are dispersed enough to make markets perfectly competitive. Preferences are described by
u
(
xiJd , y
iJ
d
)
=
(
xiJd
) 1
2
(
yiJd
) 1
2 , (2)
where xiJd and y
iJ
d denote demand by citizen i in country J .
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I use y as the numeraire, and call pJ the price of x in country J . Citizen i in country J then
maximises (2), subject to the constraint xiJd p
J + yiJd ≤ xiJpJ + yiJ . Her indirect utility is
viJ
(
pJ
)
=
xiJpJ + yiJ
2 (pJ)
1
2
, (3)
where I have simplified the notation by writing indirect utility as a function of pJ only.
Summing up across citizens, we find national indirect utility (or welfare),
vJ
(
pJ
)
=
xJpJ + yJ
2 (pJ)
1
2
. (4)
2.1.1 Autarky equilibrium
Let pJA denote the equilibrium autarky price in J . With Cobb-Douglas preferences, the marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) equals relative demand, yd/xd, which in autarky must equal relative
domestic supply, yJ/xJ . But then, consumer optimisation (pJA = MRS) requires
pJA =
yJ
xJ
. (5)
It follows that the equilibrium autarky price is 0 in CF and CM , δ in F , and 1− δ in M . Using
(4), it is easy to see that welfare reaches a global minimum at pJA (countries gain from trade).
2.1.2 Trade equilibrium
Trade policy is a stark decision: a country can be either “open” or “closed” to each of the
other two countries, and (free) trade takes place between two countries if and only if they are
both open to each other. There is then a number of possible trade outcomes : one in which
all countries belong to the same free-trade bloc (the integrated world outcome); four in which
5x and y can be alternatively thought of as intermediate goods, and (2) as a production function.
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three countries belong to the same free-trade bloc, and the fourth is in autarky; six in which two
countries belong to the same free-trade bloc, and the remaining two countries are in autarky; and
three in which two pairs of countries belong to two separate free-trade blocs. I use the notation{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
to indicate the integrated world outcome, a notation like
{
CM , CF ,M, .
}
or{
CM , .,M, .
}
to indicate outcomes in which one or two countries are in autarky, and a notation
like
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
to indicate outcomes in which countries belong to two separate free-
trade blocs.6
Given the assumption of an endowment economy, the equilibrium price within a free-trade
bloc can be calculated as the autarky price of a fictitious country endowed with the sum of
endowments of members of the bloc. Thus, in the integrated world outcome, all countries face
the price
pJ{CM ,CF ,M,F} =
yC
M
+ yC
M
+ yM + yF
xCM + xCF + xM + xF
=
1
3
. (6)
Country J ’s (net) imports of x when facing price pJ can be shown to equal
(
pJA − pJ
)
/
(
2pJ
)
:
the country imports if and only if the price that it faces is lower than its autarky price. Then,
when facing pJ = 1/3 in the integrated world outcome, CF and CM always export, F imports if
and only if δ ≥ 1/3, M imports if and only if δ < 2/3. As a whole, F ’s empire (call this CFF )
imports if and only if δ/ (1 + θ) ≥ 1/3, or δ ≥ (1 + θ) /3, and M ’s empire imports if and only if
(1− δ) / (2− θ) < 1/3, or δ < (1 + θ) /3. Figure 1 illustrate this pattern, for the case θ = 1/2.
Note that, for low values of δ, F is a competitor of CM in selling raw materials to M , while for
intermediate values it is a competitor of M in buying raw materials from CM , and, for higher
values, it buys raw materials from both CM and M . Note also that, even for intermediate values
of δ, if θ is large enough, F ’s empire is a competitor of CM in selling raw materials to M .
What is each country’s preferred trade outcome? As evident from taking the first derivative
of (4), welfare is increasing in pJ for pJ > pJA, decreasing for p
J < pJA. Intuitively, an exporter
of raw materials gains from an increase in their price, an importer loses. Then, a country’s
preferred outcome can be found by first identifying its preferred “importing outcome” (if any)
6With no transportation costs, not all countries in a free-trade bloc need to be open to all other countries.
For example,
{
CM , CF ,M, .
}
is realised if CM and CF are open to M but closed to each other, and M is open
to both.
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M imports x M exports x
F exports x F imports x
CFF exports x CFF imports x
CMM imports x CMM exports x
Figure 1: Pattern of trade in
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
, as a function of δ (for θ = 1/2). Note that CM
and CF always export x.
and “exporting outcome”, and then comparing the two.7 Results are reported in Table 1,8
δ ∈ CM ’s first best δ ∈ M ’s first best
[0, 1/(3− θ)) {CM , ·, ·,M} [0, 1/3) {CM , CF ,M, F}
[1/(3− θ), (2− θ) / (3− θ)) {CM , ·,M, F} [1/3, 3/4) {CM , CF ,M, ·}
[(2− θ) / (3− θ) , 1] {CM , ·, ·, F} [3/4, 1] {·, ·,M, F}
δ ∈ F ’s first best δ ∈ CFF ’s first best
[0, 1/4) {·, ·,M, F} [0, δ (θ)) {·, CF ,M, F}
[1/4, 2/3) {CM , CF , ·, F} [δ (θ) , 2/3) {CM , CF , ·, F}
[2/3, 1] {CM , CF ,M, F} [2/3, 1] {CM , CF ,M, F}
Table 1: National first-best trade outcomes.
where
δ (θ) ≡ (1 + θ)
2
2 (2 + θ)
, (7)
and, for brevity, I have omitted the preferences of CF . Table 1 has an intuitive interpretation.
The two colonies, CM and CF , always compete with each other to export raw materials, and also
7By this, I mean, respectively, the outcome in which the country is an importer of x and pays the lowest price,
and the outcome in which it is an exporter of x, and receives the highest price. For CM and CF , there are only
exporting outcomes.
8For values of δ such that a country is indifferent between two trade outcomes, I use its preferences to the
right of that value.
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compete with one of the imperial powers if δ is extreme. Then, CM ’s preferred outcome is one in
which the other colony is excluded from trade, and so is any competing imperial power. As for
M and F , for intermediate values of δ, they compete with each other to import raw materials,
and their preferred outcome is one in which their competitor is excluded from trade. However
for δ low, F is also exporting raw materials: then, this country’s preferred outcome is one in
which its colonial competitors are excluded from trade, while M ’s preferred outcome is one in
which it can import from all countries. A symmetric case holds for δ high. Finally, the table also
reports the preferences of F ’s empire, which will play a crucial role in equilibrium. When δ is
low, CFF is, as a whole, a competitor of CM in selling raw materials to M . Thus, the outcome
that maximises CFF ’s total welfare is one in which it trades with M exclusively. Symmetrically,
when δ is high, CFF is a competitor of M in buying raw materials from CM , and the outcome
that maximises its total welfare is one in which it trades with CM exclusively.
2.2 Political Model
I model empire in a very simple way: while M and F set policy freely, policy in CM and CF
is set by M and F respectively. Each country sets policy to maximise its own payoff (defined
below).
2.2.1 Policy
There are two policy instruments: trade policy, which is set in all countries, and a transfer from
CM to M and from CF to F , which is set in CM and CF only. I discuss these instruments in
turn. Trade policy is described by a matrix τ , whose element τ IJ is equal to 1 if I is open to trade
with J , to zero otherwise. Mapping from τ to trade outcomes and thus prices, we can write gains
from trade as a function of τ ,
ΠJ (τ) = vJ
[
pJ(τ)
]− vJA, (8)
where vJA ≡ vJ(pJA) is autarky indirect utility.
The colonial powers, M and F may extract wealth from their colonies by appropriately select-
ing trade policy, but may also be able to impose lump-sum transfer TC
M
and TC
F
, respectively
from CM to M and from CF to F . Because I focus on the colonial relationship between CM
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and M , I simplify the colonial relationship between CF and F in two ways, the first of which I
now discuss. In the case of CM , I consider two alternative situations, one in which the above-
mentioned transfer is technologically feasible (T = 1), and one in which it is not (T = 0).9 In
the case of CF , however, I only consider the case in which the transfer is feasible. Later in this
section (see footnote 25), I discuss how results would change if the transfer was not feasible.
The transfers TC
M
and TC
F
can be interpreted as the direct appropriation of colonial wealth,
for example through the appropriation of locally raised taxes, or through the reservation of
colonial assets or administrative jobs for citizens of the colonial power. In reality, direct colonial
extraction was never completely perfect, nor completely ineffective, as the cases T = 1 and T = 0
respectively imply. Indeed, the main reason to distinguish between the two is not so much to
allocate colonies to one case or another, but rather to learn about the sensitivity of results across
a range of fiscal relationships.10
I assume that, as an additional requirement for the transfers TC
M
and TC
F
to be feasible,
the colony and the imperial power must trade with each other. The only role of this assumption
is to remove implausible equilibria, existing at the extremes of the parameter space, in which an
imperial power opens up only the colony to external trade, while keeping itself in autarky, and
then extract the colonial gains from trade through the transfer. The inclusion of such equilibria
would not qualitatively affect the results,11 but would make it impossible to derive closed-form
solutions for some of the key thresholds.
2.2.2 Independence, Revolution and Sanctions
Before choosing policy, M decides whether to stick to empire, or to concede independence. In the
latter case, control of policy is transferred to CM at no cost for either country. In the former, CM
can stage a successful revolution. Revolution also transfers control of policy to CM , but inflicts
two costs on it. The first is a cost (1− θ)µ, where µ is a stochastic cost capturing the exogenous
factors that determine CM ’s relative military power (the actual cost to CM is then scaled by its
9Formally, denote by T the maximum feasible transfer. If T = 1, then T →∞, whereas if T = 0 then T = 0.
Because indirect utility is linear in income, we can think of T as a transfer of indirect utility from C to M .
10In an extension, one could consider the possibility that a share α ∈ [0, 1] of the colony’s wealth can be directly
appropriate by the mother country: changes in α would then provide an additional source of comparative statics.
11Results would be exactly unchanged in the central range of θ of δ, where the most interesting comparative
statics lies.
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size, 1 − θ).12 The distribution of µ can be described by any positive density function, defined
over the entire interval [0,∞). The second is a trade cost, since the mother country automatically
enacts trade sanctions against the rebel colony: it sets τMCM = 0.
13
I introduce sanctions by assumption, because they are not ex-post optimal in this model.
This can be justified in two ways. First, “sanctions” may actually capture the deterioration
in trade relations that is naturally associated with conflict. For example, if revolution leads to
war between CM and M , trade relations between the two may have to be interrupted, at least
temporarily. In the longer run, as found by Head et Al. (2010) for 20th century decolonisation,
colonial rebelliion may also lead to a more rapid erosion of the trade-enhancing networks of
empire. Second, it is easy to think of real-world situations - and corresponding extensions of the
current model - in which M finds it optimal to erect higher tariffs against a rebel CM . On one
hand, two independent countries will face issues of co-ordination in trade policy, that will make
it harder to achieve free trade. Such issues are well known to the literature on trade policy, and
are normally seen as a rationale for political integration (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). On
the other, M could have multiple colonies, and standard reputation arguments (e.g. Milgrom
and Roberts, 1982) could be used to rationalise (ex-post suboptimal) punitive sanctions as a
signal to other colonies. Punitive sanctions are often used in the real world, and I provide a very
clear example of this in Section 4.
For CM , there are two advantages of breaking free from empire (either through independence
or through revolution). First, it obtains control of policy. Second, it obtains an exogenous benefit
(1− θ)B,14 where B > 0 is a parameter capturing a preference for self-determination, or a gain
due to an overall inefficiency of imperial rule.15 In this interpretation, the empire does not exist
for efficiency reasons (though it may provide some efficiency gains), but only to allow M to
12Such factors include the emergence of a successful leader or ideology that helps the colonists overcome their
collective action problem; or the occurrence of external events that weaken the military power of the mother
country.
13Results are robust to modelling sanctions in a more continuous way.
14B > 0 is required for decolonisation to ever occur in equilibrium. Intuitively, if breaking free from empire
did not imply an efficiency gain, revolution would necessarily imply an efficiency loss, given a positive cost of
revolution. It would then always be possible for M to regulate policy in such a way as to make revolution
unattractive. I illustrate this point more explicitly below, when commenting on Figure 2.
15A preference for self-determination may be idealistic, or driven by the expectation that, post decolonisation,
domestic politics will be more favourable to the revolutionary groups (I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting
this last point). Imperial rule would be inefficient if CM and M had very different preferences, or if the delegation
of policy to a faraway capital was technologically inefficient.
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extract wealth from C. It should therefore disappear - in an equilibrium where nations are of
optimal size (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997) - but it may well not do so because M gains from it.16
An alternative interpretation of B > 0 is that M faces a commitment problem a la Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006), and cannot therefore promise to reduce extraction below a certain level.17
The second way in which I simplify the colonial relationship between CF and F is by assuming
that, unlike CM , CF is a docile colony, which never rebels against F . While this could be captured
formally - by assuming that CF faces a prohibitively high exogenous cost of revolution - I prefer
to keep these dynamics in the background.
2.2.3 Timing and equilibrium concept
Denote the three possible states of the colonial relationship between CM and M (empire, inde-
pendence and revolution) by S = E, I,R. The initial state is empire, S = E. The timing of the
game is:
1. Nature chooses µ.
2. M decides whether to concede independence, or stick to empire. Then, τ , TC
M
and TC
F
are simultaneously set. If S = I, τC
M
and TC
M
are set by C. If S = E, they are set by M
(τC
F
and TC
F
are always set by F ).
3. If S = E, CM decides whether to stage a revolution. Otherwise, nothing happens.
4. If S = R, τ and T are simultaneously reset, with τMCM = 0. Otherwise, nothing happens.
5. Production, trade and consumption take place. Payoffs are realised.
To get rid of a number of implausible co-ordination failure equilibria, I focus on the Coalition-
Proof Nash Equilibria (CPNE) of the policy-setting game: no coalition of countries can be able
to improve on the payoff of all its members by co-ordinating on a different policy vector.18
16To avoid trivial solutions, I assume that B is non-contractible, so that CM cannot pay its way out of empire.
This non-contractibility could originate from the fact that CM cannot commit to future payments (due after
empire has been dismantled), and cannot therefore fully compensate M for the loss of future gains from empire.
17For example, suppose M promised to set T = 0, but CM anticipated that, with probability pi, M would
actually set T = T̂ > 0. If µ < B = piT̂ , M would only be able to prevent a revolution by conceding independence.
18Without this refinement, τ being equal to the zero matrix (all countries being closed to all other countries)
could be realised in equilibrium.
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2.3 Equilibrium
Because F does not need to worry about rebellion in CF , it will always set TC
F
= vC
F
A +Π
CF (τ),
thus extracting the entire value of its colony. I now solve for the rest of the equilibrium using
backward induction.
Date 5. Payoffs depend on policy choices as follows:
V C
M
(
τ, TC
M
)
= vC
M
A + Π
CM (τ)− TCM + (1− θ) [I (S = I)B + I (S = R) (B − µ)] (9)
V M
(
τ, TC
M
)
= vMA + Π
M(τ) + TC
M
(10)
V F (τ) = vFA + Π
F (τ) + vC
F
A + Π
CF (τ) (11)
where I (S = I) and I (S = R) are indicator functions for S = I and S = R respectively. Note
that F ’s payoff is already optimised with respect to TC
F
, and does not therefore depend on it.
Date 4. If CM has staged a revolution, the policy equilibrium is (proofs in the Appendix):
Lemma 1. If the political state is revolution (S = R), in all CPNE:
• If δ ∈ [0, δ (θ)), the rebel colony falls into autarky;
• if δ ∈ [δ (θ) , 2/3), the rebel colony can trade with F ’s empire (the trade outcome is{
CM , CF , ·, F});
• if δ ∈ [2/3, 1], the rebel colony can trade with the entire world (the trade outcome is{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
);
where δ (θ) was defined in equation (7); and TC
M
= 0.
Since revolution disrupts trade with the mother country, the rebel colony’s trade must depend
on trade policy in F ’s empire. Lemma 1 relates this to endowments. When δ is low, F ’s empire
is relatively scarce in manufactures. It is then an exporter of raw materials, whose terms of
trade are best when CM is excluded from trade. In this case, F ’s trade policy accommodates
its domestic and colonial producers of raw materials, who want CM isolated in world trade.
Conversely, when δ is high, F ’s empire is relatively abundant in manufactures. It is then an
importer of raw materials, whose terms of trade are best when it trades with all exporters of raw
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materials. In this case, F trade policy accommodates its domestic producers of manufactures,
who want to open up to CM , and, if δ is very high, to M as well. Note that the threshold δ(θ) is
increasing in θ, to reflect the fact that, for given δ, F ’s empire is more likely to be a net exporter
of raw materials if it has a large colonial supply. Finally, note that the revolution makes F ’s
empire (and thus F ) better off than in the integrated world outcome, since it shifts it to its
first-best trade outcome (see Table 1). Intuitively, the revolution generates trade diversion away
from CM and M , and towards F ’s empire.
Let τ(S) denote equilibrium trade policy in state S (for S = R, this was derived in Lemma
1; for S = I and S = E it will be derived in Lemmas 2 and 3 and Proposition 1 below). Gains
from trade can then be written as a function of the state, ΠJ(S) ≡ ΠJ(τ(S)).
Date 3. If S = E, CM compares the policy equilibrium that has been realised in period 2
to the one that would be realised after a revolution. It then stages a revolution if and only if
its payoff is greater in the latter equilibrium than in the former. Using (9), the condition for
revolution not to occur can be written as19
ΠC
M
(R) + (1− θ) (B − µ) ≤ ΠCM (E)− TCM (E),
where TC
M
(E) denotes any transfer imposed under empire. The condition can be re-arranged
as,
µ ≥ B +
T (E)−
[
ΠC
M
(E)− ΠCM (R)
]
1− θ , (12)
which I refer to as the revolution constraint. Intuitively, for revolution not to occur, the cost µ
must be greater than the benefit B, plus the benefit from getting rid of any imperial transfer,
minus the cost from any expected deterioration in trade conditions.
Date 2. To decide between empire and independence, M compares the policy equilibrium
that is realised in the two cases. If it concedes independence:
Lemma 2. If the political state is independence (S = I) in all CPNE the trade outcome is{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
, and TC
M
= 0.
19(12) is the relevant condition for revolution to maximise CM ’s payoff. If, in addition, I had assumed that
CM ’s citizens are homogenous (an assumption that would not change any of the results), (12) would also be the
condition for revolution to maximise the payoff of each individual citizen of CM .
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When CM sets trade policy independently, in equilibrium, the world is integrated in trade.
To see why, note that, with F acting so as to maximise the empire’s total welfare, this is now
effectively a three-country world (CM , M and CFF ), where there are always two countries
competing to export the same good (CM and CFF competing to export raw materials if δ <
(1 + θ) /3, CFF and M competing to export manufactures if δ ≥ (1 + θ) /3). The third country
must then be open to both - or it would not obtain the best possible terms of trade for itself -
and this is enough to lead to {CM , CF ,M, F}.
If M decides on empire, it sets τM , τC
M
and TC
M
, while F simultaneously sets τF , τC
F
and
TC
F
.20 It is useful to consider first a situation in which the cost of revolution µ is large, so that
M can set policy without having to worry about revolution. I call this situation unconstrained
empire.
Lemma 3. If the political state is unconstrained empire (S = E, and µ large), in all CPNE:
• If T = 1, the trade outcome is {CM , CF ,M, F}, and TCM = ΠCM (E).
• If T = 0,
– if δ ∈ [0, (1 + θ) /3) the trade outcome is {CM , CF ,M, F};
– if δ ∈ [(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]) the trade outcome is {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]};
– if δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1] the trade outcome is {·, CF ,M, F},
and TC
M
= 0.
The equilibrium under unconstrained empire depends on the technology of extraction. If
T = 1, the world is integrated in trade. Intuitively, this is a situation in which, at the same
time, M is technologically able to impose a transfer, and it can do so without fear of revolution.
The mother country can then extract the colony’s entire wealth, and this makes it act so as to
maximise the empire’s total welfare. This is then, effectively, a two-country world (CMM and
CFF ), where both “countries” benefit from opening up to each other. If T = 0, trade restrictions
20Notice that F could set trade policy strategically, in order to trigger a revolution. For example, it could set
τFC = τ
F
M = 0, to create the expectation that only if policy is reset will C get to trade with F . Of course, such
a choice of trade policy would be a non-credible threat, since F would like to renege on it should C not stage a
revolution. I avoid these implausible complications by assuming that F sets policy with the goal of maximising
its payoff under current political institutions.
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are the only way that M can extract wealth from CM . If M ’s empire is a net importer of raw
materials, δ < (1 + θ) /3, the world is still integrated in trade. Intuitively, M is itself an importer
of raw materials in this case, and opening up to external trade is the course of action that gives
it the lowest possible price of raw materials. If M ’s empire is a net exporter of raw materials,
the equilibrium outcome is one in which M ’s empire is closed to external trade, or, if δ is very
low, one in which only CM is closed to external trade. This is because, in the first case, M is an
importer of raw materials, which benefits from keeping its abundant colonial supply for itself. In
the second case, M is an exporter of raw materials, which benefits from excluding its colony, a
trade competitor, from trade.
The result that M either only imposes a transfer, or only trade restrictions, should not be
taken literally. The capacity of colonisers to impose transfers was never neither perfect nor
non-existing, as I have assumed here: as a result, colonial extraction was typically implemented
through a mixture of transfers and trade restrictions.
In defining unconstrained empire, I have imposed that µ must be high enough. But how high,
exactly, does it have to be? To answer this question, it is sufficient to substitute equilibrium
policy under unconstrained empire, as derived in Lemma 3, in the revolution constraint (eq. 12).
For T = 1 and T = 0 respectively, this yields
µ ≥ B + Π
CM (R)
1− θ ≡ µ1 (13)
µ ≥ B + Π
CM (R)− ΠCM (τ˜ (E|T = 0))
1− θ ≡ µ0. (14)
where a tilde identifies equilibrium trade policy under unconstrained empire. The threshold µT
represents the gain from rebelling against a mother country that treats the colony in the worst
possible way. If T = 1, it is simply the benefit B, plus whatever gains from trade the colony
expects to receive after a revolution (since, under such a predatory empire, the mother country
completely expropriates the colony’s gains from trade). If T = 0, it is equal to the benefit B,
plus the change in gains from trade associated with revolution (now, the colony may be able to
retain some of its gains from trade under empire). Note that it is µ1 ≥ µ0, to reflects the fact
that the technology of extraction is more powerful in the former case.
If µ ≥ µT , the equilibrium under empire must be as described in Lemma 3. If µ < µT ,
however, the mother country will have to make concessions in order to stave off a revolution.
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Concessions may take the form of a lower transfer, or of a more open trade policy. However,
because empire is welfare decreasing (the assumption that B > 0), there exist µ low enough
that even a zero transfer, and a trade policy as open as under independence (that is to say, one
leading to the outcome
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
), are insufficient to stave off a revolution. To find such
a parameter range, substitute T (E) = 0 and τ (E) = τ (I) in the revolution constraint, and
impose that the constraint is not satisfied, to obtain21
µ < B +
ΠC
M
(R)− ΠCM (I)
1− θ ≡ µ. (15)
As formally shown in the proof to the next proposition, an open trade policy is the most
valuable trade policy concession that M can offer to CM , short of making itself worse off under
empire than under independence. Then, the threshold µ represents the gain from rebelling
against a mother country that treats the colony in the best possible way. It is equal to the
benefit B, plus the change in gains from trade associated with revolution. This is now equal to
ΠC
M
(R) − ΠCM (I), to reflect the fact that, under such a benevolent empire, the colony enjoys
as liberal a trade policy as under independence. Comparing Lemma 1 and 2 reveals that this
change is always non-positive, which is intuitive given that revolution entails trade disruption. I
refer to this loss of trade as to the trade cost of revolution.
Returning to the choice between independence and empire, one would expect that M should
stick to empire and impose maximum extraction if µ ≥ µT ; stick to empire but make some
concessions if µ ∈ [µ, µT ]; and concede independence if µ < µ. This is confirmed by
Proposition 1. In all CPNE:
• If µ ≥ µT , M sticks to empire, and policy is as in Lemma 3.
• If µ ∈ [µ, µ1), M sticks to empire, but makes concessions: if T = 1, the trade out-
come is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
, and T (E) = µ − µ < ΠCM (E); if T = 0, the trade outcome is{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
if δ ∈ [(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]), and either {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}
or
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
if δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1].
21One potential source of confusion is that M is said to concede the trade policy matrix τ (I), and thus the
trade outcome
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
; and yet parts of that matrix are in fact set by F . However, it is shown in the
proof to Proposition 1 that if M wants to obtain the outcome
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
under empire, it can always do
so, in the sense that
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
must then realise in any CPNE of the trade policy setting game.
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• If µ < µ, M concedes independence.22
To relate the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 to economic fundamentals, I represent it
in (δ, µ) space in Figure 2. The case T = 1 is represented in the left panel, while the case T = 0 is
represented in the right panel. The threshold µ is the same in the two cases. It jumps up at δ (θ),
and is then increasing in δ. By Proposition 1, the probability that M concedes independence, or
the probability that µ < µ, also follows this pattern. Intuitively, the probability of independence
is low for δ < δ (θ), because the trade cost of revolution is high (since a rebel CM would find
herself isolated in trade): instead, if δ > δ (θ), the trade cost is lower (since a rebel CM would be
able to trade with F ’s empire), and it is decreasing in δ (as F ’s empire becomes a more important
trade partner for CM).
The distance between the threshold µ and µT can be interpreted as the maximum extraction
that the mother country can possibly impose on the colony (see Lemma 3). It is different in
the two panels, to reflect the different technologies of extraction. If T = 1, it is equal to the
entire value of the colony, which is constant in δ in the integrated world equilibrium. If T = 0,
it is only positive in the range where M finds it optimal to deviate from the integrated world
equilibrium, δ ≥ (1 + θ) /3. It is first increasing in δ, to reflect the fact that to trade exclusively
with the mother country, as in
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
, becomes more costly as F becomes a more
important trade partner, and it then jumps up to reflect the cost of being relegated into autarky,
as in
{·, CF ,M, F}.23
To illustrate the model’s comparative statics with respect to both δ and θ, I represent the
probability that M grants independence (the probability that µ < µ) in (δ, θ) space in Figure 3.
It is easy to show that µ only depends on θ at the discontinuity point δ (θ),24 which as already
mentioned is increasing in δ. Then, in the figure, the probability that M grants independence is
low and constant to the North-West of the δ = δ (θ) line; jumps up as the line is crossed, and is
increasing in δ in the region to its immediate South-East; and is high and constant in the figure’s
Easternmost region.
22A CPNE always exists, with two small exceptions if T = 0 and at the extreme of the parameter range:
in particular, in a subregion of θ ∈ [0, 0.03) and δ ∈ (0.746, 0.750), and in a subregion of θ ∈ [0, 0.19) and
δ ∈ (0.803, 0.833). Full details are provided in the proofs.
23The figure confirms that, if B = 0, M never concedes independence (it is never µ < µ).
24For δ < δ (θ), it is µ = B −
{[
(1− θ)√1/3] /2} / (1− θ) = B − √1/3/2. For δ ≥ δ (θ), it is µ =
B +
{[
(1− θ)√δ/2] /2− [(1− θ)√1/3] /2} / (1− θ) = B + √δ/2/2 − √1/3/2. In both cases, µ does not
depend on θ.
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Figure 2: Full political equilibrium as a function of δ, for θ = 0.2. The left panel is for T = 1,
the right panel for T = 0.
Figure 3 summarises the main point of the paper. There are two global environments that CM
can find itself in. The first is a “hostile” environment, when F ’s empire is relatively abundant
in raw materials, (δ < δ (θ)). In this case, F ’s trade policy accommodates its domestic and
colonial net sellers of raw materials, who perceive CM as a competitor. This results in F ’s trade
policy being hostile, and in CM finding herself isolated after a revolution. The attractiveness of
revolution is then low, and so is the probability of decolonisation. The second is a “favourable”
environment, when F ’s empire is relatively scarce in raw materials (δ ≥ δ (θ)). In this case,
F ’s trade policy accommodates its domestic net buyers of raw materials, who perceive CM as a
trade partner. This results in CM being integrated in trade after a revolution, making revolution
attractive and the probability of decolonisation high. This second environment is more favourable
the higher is δ, a parameter that captures how important a trade partner F ’s empire is for CM .
Two changes in economic fundamentals can move a colony from the first environment to the
second: a fall in θ, the relative abundance of raw materials in F ’s empire versus M ’s empire, or
a rise in δ, the relative abundance of manufactures in F versus M .25
25If the transfer was not feasible in CF , the line δ = δ (θ) would be a vertical line at δ = 1/4, and the
above-mentioned comparative static with respect to θ would disappear. On reflection, this makes sense: F ’s own
first-best is to close down to all competing exporters of raw materials if δ is low, to all competing exporters of
manufactures if δ is high (see Table 1). With no transfer, F does not internalise the welfare of CF , and its choice
of trade policy does not depend on where external exporters of raw materials are located. Paradoxically, this
result indicates how robust my comparative statics is. If the threshold is vertical for T = 0, and upward sloping
for T = 1, it will then be upward sloping for all cases in between. In other words, if F internalised CF ’s welfare
even just a little (because it has some capacity to tax it), then it would still be less willing to open up to foreign
exporters, the more abundant CF is (the higher is θ). Of course, it is entirely reasonable to assume that a colonial
power will have some capacity to tax its colonies (see Section 4 for examples).
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Figure 3: Probability that M concedes independence (probability that µ < µ), as a function of
δ and θ.
In my historical analysis, I interpret the Seven Years’ War and the British Industrial Revolu-
tion as, respectively, a fall in θ and rise in δ, and study their implications for the sustainability
of empire. Before going to that, however, I briefly discuss two extensions.
3 Extensions
The role of these extensions is to discuss the robustness of my results, and to generate additional
insights. The extensions are discussed informally, while the formal analysis can be found in an
Online Appendix.
3.1 Small rebel colony
An important feature of the baseline model is that the rebel colony is large enough to be able
to affect its terms of trade. Would the comparative statics of the model become qualitatively
different in a more general setting where the colony were allowed to be small, in the sense of
international trade? To answer this question, I develop, for the case T = 1, a 5-country extension
in which the rebel colony accounts for a portion ρ ∈ (0, 1− θ] of M ’s empire, while the rest of
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the empire is docile. The case of a small rebel colony can then be captured by letting ρ → 0.
One attractive feature of this extended model is that it is now possible to change θ without
simultaneously changing the size of the rebel colony, a comparative statics that more faithfully
represents the case study on the American Revolution.
In the extended model, the two thresholds of Figure 3, δ (θ) and 2/3, are replaced by the
functions δ (θ, ρ) = (1 + θ)2 / [(1 + θ + ρ) (3− ρ)] and δ (θ, ρ) = (1 + θ + ρ) /3. Both of these
functions are increasing in θ, and converge to (1 + θ) /3 as ρ → 0. In this extreme case, there
are only two regions in Figure 3, one to the North-West of the line δ = (1 + θ) /3, and one to
its South-West. In the first region, the colony faces a hostile global environment for revolution,
while in the second it faces a favourable global environment. Because the threshold (1 + θ) /3
is increasing in θ, the comparative statics of the model is qualitatively unchanged. Intuitively,
F ’s attitude towards even a minuscule colony must still depend on the position of F ’s empire in
global trade: if the empire is a net exporter of raw materials, it will lose from admitting CM to
world trade, while if it is a net importer of raw materials, it will benefit. While these costs and
benefits are infinitesimally small, they are strictly different from zero, and switch from negative
to positive exactly at the threshold.
The fact that the threshold δ (θ, ρ) is decreasing in ρ suggest an important insight from the
extended model: at least for some parameter values, larger colonies are more likely to face a
favourable trade environment for revolution. This implies that we should more often observe
rebellion by large colonies, or that small colonies who rebel should then seek to form a coalition
acting as one in international trade. I return to this point in Section 4.
3.2 Repression and equilibrium revolution
In the baseline model, I have assumed that M can only reduce extraction or concede indepen-
dence, and that revolution is always avoided. However, as the historical evidence discussed below
well illustrates, imperial powers did use repression, and revolutions did happen. I extend the
baseline model to account for this. For simplicity, I only consider the case θ = 0, which forces
me to only consider the comparative statics with respect to δ. Faced with a low µ, M can
now accommodate colonial requests as in the baseline, or can unleash repression. In the latter
case, the probability that CM can stage a successful revolution drops to r ∈ [0, 1]. To scale up
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repression has a stochastic cost η to M .26
The main result of the extended model is that, if and only if µ < µT (so that C
M advances
requests), there exist a second threshold ηT such that, if η < ηT , M reacts to requests by
unleashing repression. If both µ < µT and η < ηT hold, then, revolution occurs with probability
r. Crucially, the threshold ηT is, for most parameter values, also increasing in δ. Intuitively, as
δ increases, not only M becomes a less important trade partner for CM (thus increasing µT ),
but also CM becomes a less important partner for M : the latter effect reduces the effective
cost of repression for M (because it decreases the cost of trade disruption in case revolution
does happen) and so increases ηT . Thus, a similar link exists between δ and the probability
that M concedes independence (discussed in the baseline), and between δ and the probability of
revolution.
Results for the case T = 0 have important historical implications. As explained above, the
probability of revolution is proportional to the probability that µ < µ1. Unlike µ, which is
increasing in δ because the trade environment outside the empire becomes more favourable, the
threshold µ1 is also increasing in δ because trade restrictions imposed by the empire becomes
more costly (see the discussion of Figure 2). There are then two separate channels through which
a high δ makes revolution more likely, both of which seems to have been at play in the case of
the Latin American Revolutionary Wars.
4 Historical evidence
In this section, I present two case studies to illustrate my comparative statics: the American
Revolution and the Latin American Revolutionary Wars. In the first case, I argue that the
outcome of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) can be interpreted as a drop in θ (e.g., from point
A to point B in Figure 3), which created a favourable global environment for the Revolution.
In the second case, I argue that the British Industrial Revolution can be interpreted as a rise
in δ (e.g. from point B to point C), which created a favourable global environment for the
Revolutionary Wars.
26For example, exogenous factors (such as war elsewhere) may determine the cost of sending reinforcements to
the colony.
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4.1 The American Revolution (1776)
I begin by stating my argument, and I then turn to the supporting evidence. I conclude by
placing my argument in the context of the pre-existing literature.
4.1.1 Argument
The Atlantic world of the mid 18th century can be mapped into the model as follows. The
thirteen colonies of the colonial US are represented by CM , while Britain and the rest of her
empire are represented by M . The other European colonial powers - France, the Netherlands
and Spain - are represented by F , while their American possessions - including Latin America
and the Caribbean (then better known as the West Indies), Louisiana, Florida, large tracts of
lands in the US Mid-West, and Canada - are represented by CF . The foodstuff and raw materials
(further described below) that the colonial US exported to the European empires are represented
by x, while the goods that it imported from them (manufactures, but also Eastern commodities
and African slaves) are represented by y. Revolution was a way for the colonial US to get rid of
the British Navigation Laws (M ’s pick of τC
M
), which I further discuss below, and various other
colonial taxes (TC
M
).27 Even more than the burden of taxation, what annoyed the colonists
was the principle that Britain could impose these taxes (e.g. Conway, 2013; Ferguson, 2004),
something that would be captured by B in the model. However, revolution was costly, since a
rebel US would suffer losses to life and property (µ > 0), as well as preferential access to some
of the markets of the British empire (τMCM = 0).
Did the environment around the colonial US change in the 1760s and 1770s, so that, based on
the comparative statics discussed in the previous section, we would predict a higher probability
of revolution? Indeed, this seems to have happened. Following defeat in the Seven Years’ War -
a major war between Britain and France which took place between 1756 and 1763 - France was
forced to surrender Canada to Britain and Louisiana to Spain. As a result, the French North
American empire was essentially reduced to the French West Indies.28 For the US North, who
competed with Canada to export foodstuff, this amounted to a large fall in θ. According to the
27An example of TC
M
would be the Stamp Act of 1765, whose purpose was to collect revenues to pay for the
British army in North America (Conway, 2013, p. 42).
28The French also retained the Canadian islands of St Pierre et Miquelon. Louisiana was briefly returned to
France in 1800, before being sold to the US in 1803.
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model, such a change should make F ’s trade policy more favourable to a rebel CM , thus reducing
the trade cost of revolution and increasing its probability.
To make this argument more precise, we need to take a closer look at the trade of the
US North in this period. The Northern colonies exported mostly foodstuff: grains and grain
products in the Middle Colonies; and fish, livestock, meat, wood products and whale oil in New
England.The West Indies, with their large populations of slaves, were by far their most important
export market. They absorbed 42% of the exports of the Middle Colonies in 1768-1772, and as
much as 63% of the exports of New England. This compared to 23% and 18% for the British isles
(McCusker and Menard, 1985, tables 5.2 and 9.3). Although part of the West Indies was British,
the French West Indies were by far the richest islands in the region, and a natural export market
for the colonial US. But until the 1750s, trade between the US and the French West Indies was
outlawed by France, who sought to protect its metropolitan food producers and help Canada to
develop into a competitor of the US North as an exporter of foodstuff.29 In terms of the model,
θ was initially high.
Following the loss of Canada, the prohibition for the French West Indies to import US food-
stuff become increasingly untenable. Having lost access to any external market in North America,
the French West Indies sugar planters saw their terms of trade deteriorate sharply in the second
half of the 1760s, resulting in acute economic distress (Goebel, 1963).30 Even more importantly,
the loss of Canada removed part of the rationale for a protectionist policy, since the dream of a
self-sufficient American empire was now gone. Not surprisingly, then, the French began to relax
restrictions on US imports in the mid 1760s, despite the opposition of metropolitan food pro-
ducers. In terms of the model, as θ decreased with the loss of Canada, F ’s trade policy became
more benevolent towards CM . Unfortunately, the impact of this change on US trade cannot be
exactly measured, since the data is almost non-existent.31 Still, anecdotal evidence suggests that
29Among the main exports of Canada to the French West indies were commodities in direct competition with
the US North, such as grain products, fish and wheat (Mathieu, 1972, p. 488). The French had a grand plan to
make the French North American empire self-sufficient in food (Gould, 1939, p. 489; Goebel, 1963, p. 335; and
Dewar, 2010, pp. 649 and 651); unsurprisingly, this was opposed by the French West Indies sugar planters, for
whom the prohibition to trade with the US implied a higher price of imported foodstuff (Goebel, 1963).
30For example, Magra (2006) argues that “...100 quintals of refuse grade dried cod could be exchanged for
slightly more than 21 hundredweights of sugar in the British islands, while the same amount of cod could fetch
almost 28 hundredweights in the French islands” (p. 162); at the same time, “The shrinkage of available markets
made French planters very willing to sell to New England buyers, and such pressures continually drove down the
price of French West Indian molasses.”(p. 161).
31Since US exports to the French West Indies was smuggling from the point of view of Britain, no official data
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US exports to the foreign West Indies increased significantly in the second half of the 1760s (see,
for example, Greene, 1980, p. 88; Magra, 2006, pp. 161-162).
We now see how the logic of the model applies to this real-world example. Before the Seven
Years’ War it could be expected that, had the US rebelled against Britain, not only it would have
been exposed to retaliatory tariffs in the British West Indies, but it would have also continued
to be excluded from the French West Indies, whose trade policy was set, at least in part, in the
interest of Canadian producers. In fact, the French might well take advantage of deteriorated
trade relations between the US and Britain to sell foodstuff to the British West Indies as well.
In terms of the model, the trade outcome would have been
{·, CF ,M, F}. After the war, the US
could expect to be able to export to the French West Indies, since the French empire was now
scarcer in foodstuff (the outcome would have been
{
CM , CF , ·, F} or {CM , CF ,M, F}).
So, the Seven Years’ War created a global environment that was more favourable to revolution
in the US North. But what kind of environment did the US South face? According to the model,
a clear distinction existed between the Upper South and the Lower South,32 with the former
facing a more favourable global environment for revolution than the latter. The export trade of
the US South was dominated by three commodities: tobacco in the Upper South and parts of
North Carolina, rice and indigo in the rest of the Lower South. These varied widely in the extent
to which they faced competition from foreign producers. At opposite extremes where indigo and
tobacco: while large supplies of high-quality indigo existed in the French and Spanish empires
(Gray, 1933, p. 589; Garrigus, 1993, p. 26), American tobacco was better than that found
anywhere else.33 As a result, American indigo was entirely consumed in Britain (where it even
benefited from a subsidy), while American tobacco was almost entirely consumed in continental
Europe, and particularly in France.34 Somewhere in the middle stood rice.35 Based on these
was collected.
32Lower South: Georgia and the Carolinas. Upper South: Virginia and Maryland.
33For example, the tobacco that France imported from Louisiana was a bit expensive and never arrived in
sufficient quantities. Tobacco imported from Spain was much too expensive, that imported from Portugal was
good only for chewing (Price, 1964, p. 502).
34More than 80% of the tobacco sent to Britain was re-exported in 1770-1774 (Schumpeter, 1960).
35This commodity was somewhat different from the other two, since its main competitor was not (or not only)
rice produced in other colonies, but rather wheat produced in the imperial powers themselves (of which rice was
a close substitute). On the one hand, most American rice was consumed in continental Europe on the eve of the
revolution. On the other hand, there was a clear upward trend in the importance of retained British imports
starting from the mid 1760s (Nash, 1992, p. 691), possibly due to the fact that population growth was much
faster in Britain than elsewhere in Europe, making domestic production of cereals relatively more scarce there.
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trade patterns, the Upper South’s situation must be captured with a low θ, and that of the Lower
South with a high θ (perhaps with the exception of North Carolina, who also produced significant
quantities of tobacco). While the tobacco planters of the Upper South could expect the European
governments to adopt a favourable trade policy after independence, in the interest of their own
consumers and fiscal revenues (an outcome like
{
CM , CF , ·, F} or {CM , CF ,M, F}),36 the indigo
and rice planters of the Lower South could expect the Europeans to adopt a protective trade
policy, in the interest of their own producers (an outcome like
{·, CF ,M, F})
I have been talking about the trade cost of revolution, however the model suggests a second
channel through which a lower θ may make revolution more attractive: by increasing the cost
of trade restrictions under empire (see also the extension in Section 3.2). Indeed, under the
British Navigation Laws, a lower θ was typically associated with tighter trade restrictions. The
US North was always restricted from trading with the Foreign West Indies, but these restrictions
became more strictly enforced after the Seven Years’ Wars.37 Amongst the key exports of the
Upper South, tobacco was the most heavily restricted: it had to be exported to Britain first,
from which it could be re-exported to continental Europe.38 In contrast, at least some of the
American rice could be sent to Europe directly. As for indigo, it was also required to be sent to
Britain first; however this was not a real restriction, since Britain was its only market.
I have focused on the export trade of the colonial US. It is important to acknowledge that the
import trade displayed a different pattern, since revenues generated through exports were mostly
use to import manufactures from Britain. British manufactures were simply of better quality,
and thus preferred by the colonists (Gray, 1933, p. 599). This pattern cannot be captured by a
2-good model, where exports of x to a country must be matched by imports of y from that same
country. However to the extent that, in a mercantilistic world, countries worried primarily about
their capacity to export, the model should still capture the most salient aspect of the trade cost
from revolution, as perceived by the colonists.
In summary, the model suggests that, in the early 1770s, a number of US Colonies (particu-
36In many European countries in the 18th century, the tobacco trade was an important source of government
revenues. For example, in France, it was a state monopoly farmed out to private interests, and, by the 1760s, a
major source of state revenues. The farmers of this monopoly found it very convenient to purchase US tobacco,
since it was cheap, versatile, and very much liked by French consumers (Price, 1964, pp. 501-504).
37The Sugar Act of 1764 reduced the taxes on trade with the Foreign West Indies, but set out to actually collect
them. To the colonists, who had until then largely evaded those taxes, the Act represented a substantial increase
in taxation.
38This implied additional costs to the Americans, to the benefit of British intermediaries and public revenues.
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larly New England and the Upper South) faced a good trade environment for revolution. They
were then particularly likely to challenge British extraction, which they soon enough started to
do. Failure by Britain to make concessions led to the revolutionary war.
4.1.2 Supporting evidence
If the mechanism of the model was important to understand the American Revolution, one would
expect trade costs to be prominent in the minds of the revolutionaries, and colonies with a higher
θ to be both less supportive of the revolution, and more severely damaged by it. I now review
the evidence in support of these hypothesis.
To begin with: was trade important for the American revolutionaries? If not, the mechanism
of the model, even if true, would have necessarily played a small role in the revolution.39 Reassur-
ingly, Sawers (1992, p. 266) argues that the minority of colonial citizens who led the revolution
had, for the most part, a substantial involvement in international trade. There is also evidence
that the revolutionaries thought a lot about the trade cost of revolution, and how to make up
for it. This emerges both in their private writings (see for example the diaries of John Adams,
as reported by Hutson, 1980, p. 30) and in the pamphlets and newspaper articles of pro- (as
well as and anti-) revolutionary propaganda, which focused to a large extent on the impact that
revolution would have on trade (Setser, 1937, p. 257). There was widespread optimism, based on
the perceived importance of the American trade, that the European countries, to whom the rev-
olutionaries sent diplomatic missions in the 1770s, were going to provide substantial commercial
support (Hoffman and Albert, 1981, p. 4).
Were colonies whose trade was more exposed less supportive of the revolution? Indeed,
despite the common indignation at British extractive policies, the colonies differed quite a lot
in their willingness to undertake concrete acts of rebellion, and broadly along the lines that we
would expect. An early example of this is the decision to boycott exports to the British Empire,
adopted by the First Continental Congress in the fall of 1774. The proposal, put forward by
Massachusetts and promoted by Virginia and North Carolina, was quickly approved by the other
colonies, with the exception of South Carolina and Georgia. The former fought in Congress to
secure an exemption for indigo and rice, on the ground that, being particularly dependent on
39In the model, this case would be captured by a very large B, and a very spread-out distribution of µ: any
change in µ would then have only a small effect on the probability of decolonisation.
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markets of the British Empire, these commodities would bear an unfair share of the cost of the
boycott (Weir, 1983, p. 316). The latter did not even send a delegation to the Continental
Congress (Gray, 1933, p. 575).
A somewhat similar pattern applies to the decision on independence. Burnett (1941, Ch. 8
and 9) describes the tortuous process which, between February and July 1776, led the Second
Continental Congress to declaring independence. Throughout the period, New England and
Virginia were always in favour of independence, which they actively promoted to the more hesi-
tant Middle and Lower Southern Colonies. Within the latter group of colonies, South Carolina
and Georgia were particularly hesitant. Weir (1983) explains that, in South Carolina, whose
representative institutions were dominated by the rice and indigo planters (p. 315), “Following
reconciliation with Great Britain, most individuals hoped to retain the reforms contained in
the constitution of 1776 [which had asserted greater control over colonial policy]. Beyond this,
however, almost no one among the established colonial elite [...] wished to go. [...] The goal,
clearly was acceptable terms of reconciliation with Britain, not independence. Yet, as British
authorities proved to be intransigent, the logic of the situation seemed to make independence
the only alternative to capitulation” (327). Gray (1933, p. 575), explains why “Georgia was the
most reluctant of the Southern Colonies to join the Revolutionary movement. It was a frontier
settlement that had depended on British military protection; it profited by subsidies form the
mother country; it contained a large number of office holders dependent on British authority;
and its principal staples enjoyed an unusual prosperity under the British commercial system.”
In the end, while Virginia declared her own independence months before the joint declaration of
July 4th, 1776, Georgia was last in sending her representatives to Congress in June 1776. In the
vote on the joint declaration, South Carolina and Pennsylvania were the only two who initially
voted against the declaration of independence, while Delaware and New York abstained.
The plausibility of my argument is also evident in the economic background of key revolu-
tionaries. “The most prominent leaders were, for the most part, merchants who dominated the
Atlantic trade like John Hancock, and tobacco planters such as Thomas Jefferson and George
Washington. Carolina rice planters such as Henry Laurens tended to support the revolution,
though not with the same vigour as the Chesepeake tobacco planters” (Sawers, 1992, p. 266).
Among the merchants, those who traded with the world outside of the British Empire were
fervent revolutionaries, while the others much less so (Tayler, 1986). Also, a strong impetus to
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the revolution came from New England’s fishing industry, who according to Magra (2006) had
greatly benefited from an expansion of activity and foreign markets following the expulsion of
the French from Canada.40
The revolution brought sanctions which damaged trade with the British Empire, but it also
brought new trade opportunities with the rest of the world. During the revolutionary war (1776-
1783), Britain sought to blockade all international trade of the rebel colonies. Nevertheless,
France, Spain and the Netherlands managed to provide significant trade support.41 According
to Gray (1933), tobacco to Europe and provisions to the West Indies were the colonial exports in
high demand, but not indigo, of which the Europeans had their own colonial supplies (p. 589).42
In the words of the American commissioners in France, tobacco was “the most weighty political
engine we could employ with the French court. It is absolutely necessary to the Farmers-General
[the monopoly who controlled the tobacco trade], and the farmers are absolutely necessary to
the government” (pp. 590-91).
After the war, the new nation faced a number of new restrictions in accessing markets of the
British Empire. It lost the subsidy on indigo exported to Britain, where it was also charged a
new tariff on rice; it was prohibited from exporting meat and fish to the British West Indies;
and it was prohibited from trading anything with the British West Indies on board American
ships. The last restriction was not only detrimental to American shipping interests, since once
ships had to come from Britain to serve the North American coastal trade, they could as well
bring British goods to sell in the islands, to the detriment of American competitors. While
restrictions with respect to the trade with the British West Indies were temporarily suspended
during the Napoleonic Wars, they were later reintroduced. They were still the main element of
discord in Anglo-American commercial relations in the late 1820s, that is a full 40 years after
the revolution (Setser, 1937, p. 223-239). This stood in contrast with a favourable trade policy
in the non-British West Indies (Bjork, 1964, p. 553; Setser, pp. 241-243).
The aggregate impact of changed trade conditions is examined in Figure 4. The right-hand
40Referring to the loss by France of the fisheries of Canada, Brook Watson (an eyewitness called before the
House of Commons in 1775) testified “That the most inferior fish is exported to the neutral or French islands,
and exchanged for molasses on very advantageous terms, as the French are prohibited from fishing. [...]” Magra
(2006, p. 124).
41See Gray, 1933, p. 576-591, and Shepherd and Walton, 1976, pp. 397-398. A formal commercial treaty with
France was signed in 1778.
42The export of rice, a commodity used to feed the army, had been prohibited by the revolutionary governments
(Ibid.).
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panel most clearly shows that, despite sanctions, the US trade with the West Indies bore relatively
little cost of revolution: while exports to the British West Indies were severely hit, buoyant
exports to the foreign West Indies more than made up for that. The left-hand side panel presents
a similar picture, though the fall in exports to Britain must, at least in part, be attributed to a
re-orientation of the tobacco trade, which in 1768-1772 had to be transhipped through Britain,
while in 1790-1792 could be exported to the rest of Europe directly. Note however that, due
to the superior experience of the British merchants as well as to the shrewd decisions by the
British government to reduce taxes on trans-shipment after the colony was lost (Gray, 1933,
p. 599), much American tobacco continued to be routed through Britain after the Revolution,
and this accounts for a large share of US exports to this country in 1790-1792. Of course, the
terms of trans-shipment were now more favourable to the Americans. Finally, it is important to
acknowledge that Britain remained by far the main source of US imports after the revolution,
something that the my simple model does not allow for.
Figure 4: US exports to the British Empire and to the Rest of the World, 1768-1772
and 1790-1792. Units: millions of pounds. Source: Shephard and Walton, 1976, p. 406.
Looking now at disaggregated effects, there is clear sense that the burden of sanctions was
positively correlated with θ. The Lower South was hit hardest. The loss of preferential access to
the British market for indigo, rice and naval stores was one of the reasons why the economy of
the Lower South suffered a sharp decline in the 1780s and 1790s (Bjork, 1964, p. 556; Williamson
and Lindert, 2008, p. 25).43 Indigo exports did particularly badly. Outcompeted by other British
43The official value of British imports from the Lower South was still far below its pre-war values in 1788
(Bjork, 1964, p. 556).
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colonies and finding little respite in external markets, the industry was essentially wiped out by
the end of the century.44 Although exports to Britain were soon to recover due to the boom of
cotton, this development could hardly be anticipated in the early 1770s (Shepherd and Walton,
1976, p. 420).45 In comparison to the Lower South, the Upper South fared much better. There,
exporters went through a period of real prosperity in the 1780s, thanks to a high price of tobacco
and buoyant exports. In fact, tobacco exports reached an all-time high in 1790-1792 (Bjork, 1964,
p. 558; Shepherd and Walton, 1976, p. 411). This should not surprise, given strong demand in
Europe and the new, more favourable terms of shipment (Shepherd and Walton, 1976, p. 407).
As contemplated in Section 3.3, revolution improved the terms of trade of the Upper South.
If the Upper South was “revealed” to face a better trade environment than the Lower South,
even more so was New England. Despite the fact that British sanctions were largely targeted at
its main exports - fish, meat, whale oil and shipping services - New England’s trade recovered
very well. In particular, with the exception of whale oil, which decreased by more than half, all
of New England’s main exports were much higher in 1790-1792 than in 1768-1772 (Shepherd and
Walton, 1976, pp. 408-410). Again, external markets - and, in particular, the expansion of trade
with the foreign West Indies - were key to such success (Shepherd and Walton, 1976, pp. 407,
412). A very similar pattern applies to the trade of the Middle Colonies, and in particular their
exports of grains and grain products (Shepherd and Walton, 1976, pp. 416-17).
4.1.3 Relation to previous literature
My argument is closely related to an historical literature that has linked the collapse of the
French North American Empire to the American Revolution (e.g. Gipson, 1950). However this
literature has focused on the fact that the demise of the French eliminated a political threat to
the colonial US. In particular, had the US become independent before the Seven Years’ War it
would have likely been taken over by the French: thus, the elimination of French colonial power
was a necessary condition for revolution (Thomas, 1965, p. 617). This argument is, in a sense,
included in mine, since the political implications of the Seven Years’ War can be captured with
44Mancall, Rosenbloom and Weiss (2008) estimate that indigo exports declined from 488,000 lb in 1790 to only
5,000 lb in 1800.
45The innovation that essentially created the Southern cotton economy - Eli Whitney’s cotton gin - was only
made in 1793. Cotton exports from the Lower South were still less than 5% of indigo exports in 1790-1792
(Shepherd and Walton, 1976, p. 408).
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a decrease in µ in the model. In addition, I argue that the Seven Years’ War also eliminated
an economic threat: the French were trade competitors before the war, not so much afterwards.
Even though both points may be valid, the evidence presented in the previous section suggests
that the second one should not be overlooked.
My argument is also related to the debate on the economic origins of the American Revo-
lution.46 This literature has been focused on assessing the burden of the Navigation Laws, in
order to determine whether it is reasonable to see the revolution primarily as an attempt to get
rid of those. While the literature is divided on how best to estimate the burden, it agrees on
the difficulty to establish a counterfactual, since the alternative to being in the British Empire
was not a world of free trade, but a different mercantilist world.47 The contribution of my model
is to identify that counterfactual, and, crucially, the way in which they changed just before the
revolution.
Finally, an alternative explanation for why France supported the American Revolution is that
it wanted to weaken Britain, its long-standing 18th century foe. Although I do not dispute this,
there is evidence that grass-root economic forces of the sort illustrated in the model contributed
to strengthening French support. Goebel (1963) suggests that the French colonials supported
the American Revolution for purely economic reasons: “Dependent on the New England trade,
the French colonials were to favor the American cause; French colonial officials were to open the
island ports to American agents and to urge on the home authorities a liberal trade policy.” (p.
372). While it is hard to evaluate the extent to which such urges, as opposed to geopolitics,
motivated the actions of the French government, the position of the French colonials must have
mattered for US trade on the ground, since it was typically down to colonial officials to decide
which goods to admit into their ports.
4.2 The Latin American Revolutionary Wars (1808-1827)
This section follows the same structure as the previous section.
46See the literature review by Walton (1971), and Sawers (1992) for a more recent contribution.
47For example, Ransom (1968, p. 434) says that “[...] estimating the “benefits” of British colonial rule may be
a much more formidable task than the one set forth here. As Thomas correctly asserts, to leave the Empire is
to move into a mercantilistic world, not a world of free trade. The confusion following the American Revolution
shows how substantial an impact such a move could have. [...] Breaking away from this trading community
involved a host of uncertainties, and the “costs” were substantial. The pessimism regarding the economic outlook
of the Colonies as late as 1790 shows the magnitude of the adjustments required.”
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4.2.1 Argument
For the model to fit this second case study, CM must now represent the Latin American colonies,
and M must represent Spain and Portugal. The other European countries with which Latin
America traded, and most importantly Britain, are represented by F , while CF represents those
countries’ colonies. Latin America, traditionally an exporter of silver, had by the 18th century
also become a significant exporter of raw materials (x), which it sold to Europe in exchange
for manufactures (y). The Revolutionary Wars of 1808-1827 - a way for the colonies to get
rid of the “national monopolies” which regulated colonial trade (M ’s pick of τC
M
) and various
other forms of imperial taxation (TC
M
)48 - can be seen as sparked by an exogenous factor, the
invasion of Iberia by Napoleon: a decrease in µ in the model. My argument is that we should
not be surprised of the effects of Napoleon’s invasion, since the Latin American colonies faced
a favourable global environment for revolution: just like an increase in δ (e.g. from point A to
C in Figure 3), the Industrial Revolution was increasing Britain’s need to import raw materials,
and thus the trade opportunities that the Latin America colonies faced outside of their empire
(as opposed to within). This made revolution an attractive option.
The Industrial Revolution can be adequately captured with an increase in δ, the relative
abundance of manufactures in F versus M . The British cotton textile sector grew by 7% per
annum between 1770 and 1815 (Crafts and Harley, 1992, p. 713), pushed by an enormous increase
in productivity due to mechanisation (Bairoch, 1989, p. 109). European manufacturing was
relocating to Britain by the early 1800s: the British share in European manufacturing increased
from 15% in 1800 to 28% in 1830, and per-capita industrialisation, which stood at 110% of the
European average in 1800, reached 250% by 1830 (Bairoch, 1989, p. 10).
Just like an increase in δ (for example, in Figure 1: from δ ∈ [1/3, 2/3], to δ ∈ [2/3, 1]),
the Industrial Revolution had several important effects on contemporary trade patterns. First,
Britain increasingly specialised in the export of manufactures and in the import of raw materials,
while Spain and Portugal did just the opposite (Figure 5). Second, Spain and Portugal traded
progressively less with Latin America, and more with Britain: so, the mother countries converted
48By the provisions of the Spanish national monopoly, all colonial trade had to be transhipped through Spain,
where it was taxed by the government. This is the sort of trade restrictions that the equilibrium outcome{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
would capture, admittedly in stylised way, in the model. In addition, the Spanish king
collected taxes on the silver produced in the colonies, and reserved most top colonial jobs for citizens of the
mother country (and example of TC
M
).
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Figure 5: Pattern of specialization by type of commodity, 1785-1827. Sources: Davis (1979)
and Prados de la Escosura (1984). All data points in the British series are calculated as three-year averages of
the values in t− 1, t and t+ 1.
Figure 6: Spain, pattern of specialization by geography, 1792-1827. Source: Prados de la
Escosura (1984), p. 145.
from being competitors of Britain in selling manufactures to the colonies, to being competitors of
the colonies in selling raw materials to Britain (Figure 6).49 And third, the industrial revolution
resulted in a large increase in trade between Britain and Latin America (Figure 7).50 51
49Although part of this change can be explained by the Latin American revolutions themselves - which broke
the special trade relations between the colonies and the former mother countries - Prados de la Escosura (1984, p.
140) emphasises that its deep causes were Spain’s loss of competitiveness vis-a-vis Britain (Prados de la Escosura
and Tortella Casares, 1983, pp. 355-356).
50The model would actually predict that the share of Britain in the Latin American trade should increase. While
the historical evidence overwhelmingly confirms this, lack of disaggregated trade data for the Latin American
colonies prevents us from verifying this directly.
51Until the early 19th century, when this regulation was relaxed, all Spanish American trade had to be inter-
mediated through Spain. This resulted in a substantial amount of smuggling between Britain and the Spanish
American colonies, passing through the British Antilles. According to Prados de la Escosura (1984b, p. 125;
see also Graham, 1994, pp. 5-6), the time variation in British imports from the British Antilles provides further
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Total imports from LA Share of LA in total imports.
Figure 7: Britain, total imports from Latin America and share of Latin America in
total imports, 1785-1855. Unit: thousands of £. Sources: the series for total British imports from Latin
America is the sum of direct imports from Latin America as recorded in the British data (Davis, 1979, p. 93) and
of the estimate provided by Prados de la Escosura (1984b, pp. 143-144) for imports from Latin America through
Spain. The series for the share of Latin American in British imports of raw materials is direct imports from Latin
America only (Davis, 1979). All data points are calculated as three-year averages of the values in t − 1, t and
t+ 1.
Also consistent with the model’s predictions, the Industrial Revolution made British trade
policy more favourable to foreign exporters of raw materials. During the age of mercantilism
(1650-1780), the European empires were built with the goal of achieving self-sufficiency, if not
export capacity, in key raw materials. In this environment, imperial trade policy was often hostile
to foreign producers of raw materials, in the interest of domestic and colonial producers.52 By
vastly increasing her demand for raw materials, the Industrial Revolution forced Britain out
of this pattern. As Figure 6 illustrates, the share of British imports coming from the British
empire declined continuously between 1773 and 1855.53 This process went hand-in-hand with
evidence of a boom in British imports from Spanish America in the first two decades of the 19th century.
52A good example of this is provided by the experience of the US South after the American Revolution (see
the previous section).
53The construction of these estimates required making several assumptions. Davis (1979) provides a continuous
series for total imports of major/total raw materials/foodstuff in 1785-1855. He also provides the same series for
some clearly imperial sources such as Australia, Canada and the West Indies. For other imperial sources, two
complications arise: 1) Ireland drops out of the data after 1825, as the British and Irish customs were merged. I
have therefore opted to exclude Ireland as an imperial source from the beginning, but the pattern illustrated in the
figure is robust also when it is included. 2) Asia is reported as a single block throughout the period, and we don’t
know what sources are imperial and what not; furthermore, China is included in the series until 1825, excluded
thereafter. For consistency, I have included China in the Asia series after 1825 as well. To reflect progressive
British expansion in India over the period 1773-1855, I have considered a (linearly) growing share of imports from
Asia to be “imperial”. For total raw materials and foodstuff, this share rises from 14% in 1773 to 70% in 1855,
while for cotton, hides & skins and dyes (excluding indigo) it rises from 20% in 1773 to 100% in 1855. These
different trends reflect the fact that China, that was not part of the British empire, was an important source of
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the adoption of more outward-oriented trade policies from the early 19th century, culminating
in the adoption of free trade in the 1840s and 1850s. Emblematic is the case of cotton, the most
important imported commodity of the Industrial Revolution, which the British government had
initially wanted to be primarily sourced from the British West Indies but which Manchester
manufacturers succeeded in keeping freely importable from all foreign countries (Harlow, 1964,
pp. 281-287). In terms of the model, an 18th century mercantilist empire can be captured by
point A in Figure 3: it has a sufficient colonial supply of raw materials, and is therefore hostile
to a foreign producer like CM (it chooses
{·, CF ,M, F}). A liberal empire, such as the British
Empire became in the 19th century, can be captured by point C: it is starved in raw materials,
and it willingly opens up to any external producers (it choses
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
). The role of the
Industrial Revolution was to move the British Empire from point A to point C, thus improving
the trade policy environment faced by the Latin American colonies.
So, the model’s prediction for the impact of the Industrial Revolution on trade patterns and
trade policy are well born out by the data. But is there any direct evidence that this contributed
to creating a favourable environment for Latin American rebellion? To this question I now turn.
4.2.2 Supporting evidence
That the Latin American revolutionaries were greatly helped by economic evolutions in Britain
is clear from the fact that received substantial support from both the British government and
from the British private sector (both during and after the revolution), and that such support
was primarily motivated by trade considerations.
To put things in context, it is important to note that political expedience would have advised
Britain against providing support to the rebel colonies. On the one hand, by helping the colonies,
raw materials and foodstuff, but almost no cotton, hides & skins and dyes (excluding indigo) were sourced there
in this period. For 1773, Davis (1962) only provides imports from a vast “America” aggregate, including the
US, Canada, the West Indies, Portuguese and Spanish America and West Africa. For total imports of foodstuff
and raw materials, I have used data on US and Canadian exports in 1768-1772 (from McCusker and Menard,
1985) to infer British imports from these colonies, and subtracted this from total imports from America to infer
British imports from the West Indies (assuming that direct imports from other parts of the America and West
Africa were relatively small in this period). For imports of cotton, hides & skins, and dyes (excluding indigo), I
have assumed that the share of US, Canada and the West Indies was the same in 1773 as it was in 1785. This
is likely to lead to under-estimation of the relative decline in imports from empire in 1773-1785, because of the
trade disruption provoked by the American Revolution. To summarize, imports from empire are then calculated
as the sum of imports from Australia, Canada, the US (for 1773 only, excluded thereafter) and the West Indies,
and a share of imports from Asia calculated as described above.
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Figure 8: Britain, estimated share of empire in imports of raw materials, total and
selected commodities, 1773-1855. Sources: Davis (1962, 1979), McCusker and Menard (1985). The
construction of these estimates required making several assumptions, described in footnote 53.
Britain risked alienating Spain and Portugal, two war-time allies and important political partners
in post-restoration Europe (Miller, 1993; Kaufman, 1951, p. 78). To support a revolution was
also deeply at odds with the spirit of reaction that prevailed in Europe, and was feared it
could help spread Jacobin principles around the world (Paquette, 2004, p. 75, Harlow, 1964,
p. 631). Despite all this, Britain provided substantial support to the rebel colonies. From as
early as the late 1790s, it provided a safe heaven for Latin American conspirators, some of whom
had access to the top echelons of British government (Harlow, 1964, pp. 642-652; Paquette,
2004, footnote 78). During the revolutions, the British government refused to help Spain and
Portugal to restore order, and took various steps to prevent other European powers from doing
so.54 At the same time, the British merchants lent more than £1 million to Simon Bolivar (the
liberator of Gran Colombia), contributing to his success after 1816 (Graham, 1993, p. 119). And
after independence, Britain was quick to recognise the newly formed republics as independent
54For example, the Royal Navy was stationed in the South Atlantic from 1808 onwards, officially to protect
British trade but effectively to prevent foreign interventions (Miller, 1993, p. 36). And in two separate occasions
in 1817 and 1823, Britain blocked the formation of a European coalition against the colonies (Graham, 1993, p.
112). This policy of indirect support was anticipated by Lord Castlereagh, Secretary of War and the Colonies,
who in 1807 declared himself “doubtful [...] about attempting to foment revolt against Spain, although should it
occur British forces might act as auxiliaries and protectors” (Miller, 1993, p, 35).
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countries.
Considerations about trade were a primary motivation behind British support. Already in
1803, a report put in front of the government by British industrialists had stressed that the
needs of Britain and Latin America were complementary, and that there was enormous potential
for mutual exchange. The goal of the industrialists was to tilt British policy in the direction
of supporting a possible revolution, something that, according to Harlow (1964, pp. 615-662)
they eventually managed to achieve. A few years later Lord Castleraigh, Secretary for Foreign
Affairs from 1812 to 1822, declared that Britain should direct her policy towards “[...] creating
and supporting an amicable and local government, with which those commercial relations may
freely subsist which it is alone our interest to aim at, and which the people of Latin America
must equally desire” (Winn, 1976). After the revolutions, a key factor that induced Britain to
recognise the newly-independent republics was the growth of British industry, and the resulting
voracious appetite of the British merchants for Latin American trade (Paquette, 2004, pp. 75-
76). Significantly, the very first bilateral treaties signed between Britain and the republics were
trade treaties, granting the republics “most favoured nation” treatment on the British market
(Palmer, 1990, p. 52).55
British actions are easy to rationalise in the context of the model (though the model does not
admit that F could support the revolution). As δ increases over 2/3, M ’s imperial trade policy
(leading to either
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
) or
{·, CF ,M, F}) becomes more restrictive of trade
between CM and F , precisely at a time in which F would like to import more from CM . As a
consequence, the gain to F from revolution in CM increases. Just as well, the Latin American
trade became increasingly attractive to Britain as the Industrial Revolution progressed, as so did
the prospect of freeing the Latin American colonies from their increasingly protective empires.
Were the revolutionaries aware of the favourable trade environment, and did this help to
motivate them? Clearly, the revolutionaries knew of the importance of their trade with Britain,
and used this as a bargaining chip in negotiations. The offer of commercial alliances was a key
negotiating strategy used by conspirators in London (Harlow, 1964, 642-644), as well as by the
independent governments established after 1810.56 For example, in 1822, the government of Gran
55Already in 1822, Spanish American ships were granted, subject to reciprocity, direct access to British ports,
a privilege that no foreign country other than the US had. Commercial treaties were signed with Gran Colombia
and Rio del Plata in 1825, with Mexico in 1826, and with Brazil in 1827 (Palmer, 1990, p. 41, 52).
56For example, the Venezuelan revolutionary government offered preferential tariffs to Britain while sending
emissaries to London to secure diplomatic support (Graham, 1993, p. 89).
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Colombia was able to use the threat of commercial sanctions to secure important concessions
concerning the right of Latin American ships to land in British ports (Palmer, 1990, p. 41
and 52). At the same time, trade considerations must have had a great importance for the
revolutionaries, which were largely the expression of a creole elite with strong interests in the
international economy. For example, in Rio del Plata, the cattle ranchers and merchants, who
thrived on the trade in hides and skins with Europe (Graham, 1993, pp. 41-42), were among
the key supporters of revolution. In Venezuela, the revolution was actively supported by the
aristocracy of export-oriented landowners (Ibid., pp. 47, 63). In Mexico, key players such as the
coastal planters and the mine owners were all very interested in a strengthening of their trade
with Europe (Ibid., p. 52).
Interestingly, for a while after gaining independence, the Latin American colonies sought to
unite into larger federal polities such as “Gran Colombia” and “The United Provinces of Rio
del Plata”.57 The extension discussed in Section 3.3 suggest one rationale for doing this: newly-
independent countries with a larger economic size (higher ρ) are even more likely to be treated
favourably by foreign trade policy.
4.2.3 Relation to previous literature
My argument belongs to a historical literature that has emphasised the role of the international
environment, and particularly Britain, in explain the Revolutionary Wars (e.g. Dominguez,
1980, p 116). I expand upon this literature by analysing, in the context of a formal model, the
economic factors that created this environment. My interpretation is not inconsistent with the
view that the Latin American revolutions were caused by the Napoleonic Wars, but it emphasises
the importance of the context: had this been different, the Revolutionary Wars may not have
happened. This is line with the observation, made by Lynch (1973) in support of a different
argument, that Spain did not lose her empire when it was invaded one century earlier, at the
time of the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714).
A strand of literature has linked the Revolutionary Wars to the rise in Spanish extraction
towards the end of the 18th century,58 and particularly to the fact that, due to increasing volumes
57Due to their great economic and political heterogeneity, these policies collapsed shortly after being formed.
58There is substantial evidence that extraction increased in Spanish America, as the so called “Bourbon reforms”
set out to strengthen imperial control over the colonies. Also, the return of the Portuguese king to Portugal after
the restoration was associated with an increase in Portuguese extraction (Graham, 1993, pp. 103-104 and 128-
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of trade between Latin America and North-Western Europe, imperial trade restrictions, which
required all colonial goods to be transhipped through the mother country, became more onerous.
This argument is consistent with findings in the model with repression and equilibrium revolution
(see Section 3.3): when M chooses to repress, an increase in δ both improves trade opportunities
outside of the empire, and increases the cost of trade restrictions within the empire.
Finally, the literature on the optimal size of nations has drawn a link between the movement
for independence in Latin America and an increasingly liberal trade policy in the early 1800s
(Alesina and Spolaore, 2003, p. 191). My paper formalises this idea, by deriving equilibrium trade
policy as a function of economic fundamentals, in the context of a formal model of revolution.
5 Conclusions
This paper has emphasised the importance of trade for the sustainability of empire. If foreign
countries are scarce in manufactures relative to the mother country, or their empires are abundant
in raw materials, their trade policy is unsupportive of a rebel colony, and empire is more stable.
Conversely, if foreign countries are abundant in manufactures, or their empires are scarce in raw
materials, their trade policy is supportive, and empire is less stable. I have argued that this
simple mechanism may help to explain the timing of the American Revolution (1776) and the
Latin American Revolutionary Wars (1808-1827).
My results imply that industrial leaders should be able to retain larger empires, since their
colonies will often find that, being in cut-throat competition with foreign countries to export raw
materials to the mother country, they should not try to rebel. In terms of Figure 3, if δ is low
(so that M is relatively abundant in manufactures), θ may well be low (so that M ’s empire is
large) but the likelihood of decolonisation will remain small. This may explain why Britain was
able to construct such a large empire in the 19th century. In comparative terms, it complements
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005)’s argument on the different trajectories of the British
versus Spanish and Portuguese empires. According to those authors, the gains from empire
accelerated industrialisation in Britain, while they slowed it down in Spain and Portugal. My
results suggest that, in turn, industrialisation helped Britain build such a large and successful
empire, whereas lack of industrialisation led Spain and Portugal to lose much of their empires
133).
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early.
A second implication of the model is that there is a rationale for colonisers to block indus-
trialisation in the colonies. Suppose that investment can increase the amount of manufactures
in CM , from zero to a positive amount. It is possible to show (and the derivations are available
form the author upon request) that even if investment is profitable and M can fully tax it, it
may still want to block it. This is because a colony with its own manufacturing base would suffer
less from the trade disruption generated by revolution, and would thus be more likely to ask for
concessions. This result may help explain widespread anti-industrial policies in the colonies. It
may also help explain the rise of pro-independence movements in colonies where, during World
War 2, import-substitutions had created groups of industrialists (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007)
who stood to gain from a weakening of the imperial connection.
The model has sharp predictions for the link between economic fundamentals, the pattern of
trade, and the probability of colonial rebellion (or secession more in general), as well as the role
played by third countries in this process. These predictions could be tested by taking advantage
of the fact that, close to the point where F switches from being a competitor of CM to being
a partner, the cost of rebellion falls discretely. One could test whether episodes in which a
large country switched from exporting to importing a commodity x, were associated with more
secession in regions specialised in the production of x, and the role that the large country’s
diplomacy played in all this. I keep this and other related work for future research.
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Appendix
For any two outcomes {O1} and {O2}, let pJ{O1} and pJ{O2} be the prices that they generate in
country J , and let {O1} J {O2} be equivalent to vJ
(
pJ{O1}
)
> vJ
(
pJ{O2}
)
. I use the notation
“{O}” to indicate any trade outcome from a list previously presented.
Result 1. Suppose that a country J can import at a price pJi = p
J
A/a, where a > 1, or export at
a price pJe > p
J
A. Then, country J is indifferent between the two prices iff p
J
A = p
J
e /a; it prefers
pJi if p
J
A ≥ pJe /a; it prefers pJe if pJA < pJe /a.
Proof. We need to show that J is indifferent between importing at price pJA/a, or exporting at
price apJA. This follows immediately from
vJ
(
pJA
a
)
=
pJA
a
+ pJA
2
√
pJA
a
=
apJA + p
J
A
2
√
apJA
= vJ
(
apJA
)
.
Derivation of national first-best trade outcomes. Since CM is always an exporter,
its first best must be, among the trade outcomes in which it trades, the one with the highest
price. This cannot include CF , since to do so always decreases the price. Three outcomes are
left,
{
CM , ·,M, ·}, {CM , ·,M, F} and {CM , ·, ·, F}. A comparison of prices reveals the pattern
presented in Table 1. Since M is always an importer for δ < 1/2, its first best in this range
must be, among the trade outcomes in which it trades, the one with the lowest price. This
cannot exclude CM or CF , since to exclude either of them always decreases the price. Two
outcomes are left,
{
CM , CF ,M, ·} and {CM , CF ,M, F}. A comparison of prices reveals the
pattern presented in Table 1. If δ ≥ 1/2, M is an importer in some outcomes, an exporter
in others. Its first best must be either the outcome in which it imports at the lowest price,{
CM , CF ,M, ·}, or the outcome in which it exports at the highest price, {·, ·,M.F}. Using
Result 1, it is easy to see that M ’s first best is the former outcome if δ ∈ [1/2, 3/4), the latter
outcome if δ ∈ [3/4, 1). A symmetric pattern holds for F . As for CFF , since it is always
an importer for δ ≥ (1 + θ) / (2 + θ) ∈ [δ (θ) , 2/3], its first best in this range must be, among
the trade outcomes in which it trades, the one with the lowest price. This cannot exclude
CM , since to exclude it always increases the price. Two outcomes are left:
{
CM , CF , ·, F} and
45
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
. A comparison of prices reveals the pattern described. If δ < (1 + θ) / (2 + θ),
CFF is an importer in some outcomes, an exporter in others. Its first best must be either the
outcome in which it imports at the lower possible price,
{
CM , CF , ·, F}, or the outcome in which
it exports at the highest possible price,
{·, CF ,M, F}. Using Result 1, it is easy to see that M ’s
first best is the former outcome if δ ∈ [(1 + θ)2 / [2 (2 + θ)] , (1 + θ) / (2 + θ)), the latter outcome
if δ ∈ [0, (1 + θ)2 / [2 (2 + θ)]).
Proof to Lemma 1. Note that, since it controls trade policy in CF , and given τMCM = 0,
F fully determines whether CM and M can trade, and at what conditions. Furthermore, if
offered the possibility to trade (as opposed to being in autarky), CM and M are always better
off accepting. It follows that, if S = R, no outcome other than F ’s optimum - that is, the
outcome that maximises F ’s payoff, V F
(
τ, TC
F
)
- can be realised in a CPNE, since, from any
such outcome, F would be able to deviate to its optimum, either unilaterally or in a coalition
where it offers to CM , M , or both, the possibility to switch from autarky to trade. I next
identify F ’s optimum. Consider first cases in which CF and F trade with each other. Because
F can set TC
F
under no constraint, it must set TC
F
= ΠC
F
(τ). Then, F ’s payoff can be
written as V F (τ) = vC
F
[
pC
F
(τ)
]
+ vF
[
pF (τ)
]
= vC
FF
[
pC
FF (τ)
]
. It follows that, considering
only outcomes such that CF and F trade with each other, F ’s optimum is the outcome that
maximises vC
FF
[
pC
FF (τ)
]
. Next, consider outcomes in which CF and F do not trade with each
other. Then, F ’s payoff can be written as V F (τ) = vF
[
pF (τ)
]
. There are two cases: if δ ≥ 1/4,
vF
[
pF (τ)
]
is maximised by an outcome in which CF and F trade with each other, if δ < 1/4
it is maximised by {·, ·,M, F} (see Table 1). It follows that, if δ ≥ 1/4, F ’s optimum is the
outcome that maximises vC
FF
[
pC
FF (τ)
]
, if δ < 1/4 it is either the outcome that maximises
vC
FF
[
pC
FF (τ)
]
, or {·, ·,M, F}. This establishes that, if S = R, the only trade outcomes that
can realise in a CPNE are the ones described in Lemma 1. Finally, I show that such outcomes
can be realised in a CPNE. If δ < 1/4, and F ’s optimum is {·, ·,M, F}, any trade policy vector
such that τC
F
J = 0 ∀J and τFM = τMF = 1 (leading to {·, ·,M, F}) is a CPNE, since: CM cannot
unilaterally deviate to a different outcome; M can only unilaterally deviate to autarky; and,
given the requirement that τMCM = 0, C
M and M can only jointly deviate to an outcome where
they are both in autarky. If δ < 1/4 and F ’s optimum is
{·, CF ,M, F}, or if δ ∈ [1/4, δ (θ)),
any trade policy vector such that τC
F
F = τ
F
CF = 1, τ
CF
CM = τ
CF
M = 0, and τ
F
M = τ
M
F = 1 (leading to{·, CF ,M, F}) is a CPNE, since: CM cannot unilaterally deviate to a different outcome; M can
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only unilaterally deviate to autarky; and, given the requirement that τMCM = 0, C
M and M can
only jointly deviate to an outcome where they are both in autarky. If δ ∈ [δ (θ) , 2/3), so that
F ’s optimum is
{
CM , CF , ·, F} any trade policy vector such that τFCF = τCFF = 1, τFM = τCFM = 0,
τFCM = τ
CM
F = 1 (leading to
{
CM , CF , ·, F}) is a CPNE, since: M cannot unilaterally deviate
to a different outcome; CM can only unilaterally deviate to autarky; and, given the requirement
that τMCM = 0, C
M and M can only jointly deviate to an outcome where they are both in autarky.
Finally, if δ ∈ [2/3, 1], so that F ’s optimum is {CM , CF ,M, F} any trade policy vector such that
τFCF = τ
CF
F = 1, τ
F
M = τ
M
F = 1, and τ
F
CM = τ
CM
F = 1 (leading to
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
) is a CPNE,
since: CM and M can only unilaterally deviate to autarky; and, given the requirement that
τMCM = 0, C
M and M can only jointly deviate to an outcome where they are both in autarky. 
Proof to Lemma 2. Preliminaries. Given S = I, there are three independent players:
CM , M , and F . Clearly, it must be optimal for CM to set TC
M
= 0, and for F to set TC
F
=
ΠC
F
(τ) if CF and F trade with each other, TC
F
= 0 otherwise. Then, CM ’s payoff can be writ-
ten as vC
M
[
pC
M
(τ)
]
+ (1− θ)B, M ’s payoff as vM [pM (τ)], and F ’s payoff as vCFF [pCFF (τ)]
if CF and F trade with each other, as vF
[
pF (τ)
]
otherwise. Take any two outcomes {O1} and
{O2}. If {O2}, but not {O1}, is an outcome such that CF and F do not trade with each other,
{O1} gives a higher payoff to F iff vCFF
(
pC
FF
{O1}
)
> vF
(
pF{O2}
)
, which is true if {O1} F {O2}; if
both outcomes are such that CF and F do not trade with each other, {O1} gives a higher payoff
to F iff {O1} F {O2}; in all other cases {O1} gives a higher payoff to F iff {O1} CFF {O2}.
The proof proceeds in two steps. Step 1. No outcome other than
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
can be
realised in a CPNE. Not
{
CM , ·,M, F}, since it is vCFF (pCFF{CM ,CF ,M,F}) > vF (pF{CM ,·,M,F})
for δ ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [0, 1).59 Since F can single-handedly obtain {CM , CF ,M, F}, there is a vi-
able deviating coalition. Not {·, CF ,M, F}, since {CM , CF ,M, F} M {·, CF ,M, F} if M is an
importer,
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} CFF {·, CF ,M, F} if CFF is an importer; and CM and M (F ) can
jointly obtain this outcome. Not
{
CM , CF ,M, ·}, since {CM , CF ,M, F} F {CM , CF ,M, ·},
and F can single-handedly obtain this outcome. Not
{
CM , CF , ·, F}, since {CM , CF ,M, F} CM{
CM , CF , ·, F} if M is an importer in {CM , CF ,M, F}, {CM , CF ,M, F} CFF {CM , CF , ·, F}
59We can write vC
FF
(
pC
FF
{CM ,CF ,M,F}
)
− vF
(
pF{CM ,·,M,F}
)
= (1 + θ) 1
2
√
3
− 1
2
√
3−θ +
δ
2
(√
3−√3− θ) ≡ A. It
is A > 0 for δ ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [0, 1). To see this, note that, for δ ∈ [0, 1], the RHS of (??) is increasing in δ for
θ ∈ (0, 1), constant in δ for θ = 0. It is also possible to show that, for θ ∈ [0, 1), the RHS is increasing in θ for
δ ∈ [0, 1]. Since the RHS is equal to 0 for δ = θ = 0, (??) holds for all available δ and θ. By symmetry, it is
always vC
MM
(
pC
MM
{CM ,CF ,M,F}
)
> vM
(
pM{·,CF ,M,F}
)
.
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if M is an exporter; and CM (F ) and M can jointly obtain this outcome. Not
{
CM , CF , ·, ·},
since it is
{
CM , CF ,M, ·} CM {CM , CF , ·, ·} and {CM , CF ,M, ·} M {CM , CF , ·, ·}, and
CM and M can jointly obtain this outcome. Not {·, ·,M, F}, {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]}, since it
is
{
CM , ·,M, F} CM {·, ·,M, F} and {CM , ·,M, F} CM {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]}, and either{
CM , ·,M, F} M {·, ·,M, F} and {CM , ·,M, F} M {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]} (if M is an im-
porter) or
{
CM , ·,M, F} F {·, ·,M, F} and {CM , ·,M, F} F {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]} (if F is
an importer); and CM and either M (F ) can jointly obtain this outcome. Not
{
CM , ·,M, ·},{·, CF , ·, F} or {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}, since {CM , CF ,M, F} CFF {O}, and {CM , CF ,M, F} M
{O} if CFF is an exporter in {CM , CF ,M, F}, {CM , CF ,M, F} CM {O} if CFF is an im-
porter; and M (CM) and F can jointly obtain this outcome. Not
{
CM , ·, ·, F}, {·, CF ,M, ·}, or{[
CM , F
]
,
[
CF ,M
]}
, since
{
CM , CF , ·, F} F {CM , ·, ·, F} ,{·, CF ,M, ·} and {CM , CF , ·, F} CFF{[
CM , F
]
,
[
CF ,M
]}
; and F can single-handedly obtain this outcome, and so can CM and F
jointly. Step 2.
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
may be realised in a CPNE. To see this, suppose τJI = 1
∀I, J , so that {CM , CF ,M, F} is realised. No other outcome can be obtained by a viable coali-
tion. Not
{
CM , ·,M, F}: this can only be obtained by a coalition including F ; however, as shown
earlier in this Appendix, vC
FF
(
pC
FF
{CM ,CF ,M,F}
)
> vF
(
pF{CM ,·,M,F}
)
for all δ ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [0, 1).
Thus, such a coalition is not viable. Not {·, CF ,M, F}: this can only be obtained by a coalition
including either CM , or both M and F ; however it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} CM {·, CF ,M, F}, and{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {·, CF ,M, F} if M is an importer, {CM , CF ,M, F} CFF {·, CF ,M, F}
if CFF is an importer. Not
{
CM , CF ,M, ·}: this can only be achieved by a coalition in-
cluding F ; however it is vC
FF
(
pC
FF
{CM ,CF ,M,F}
)
> vF
(
pF{CM ,CF ,M,·}
)
. Not
{
CM , CF , ·, F}: this
can only be obtained by a coalition including either M , or both CM and F ; however it is{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {CM , CF , ·, F}, and {CM , CF ,M, F} CM {CM , CF , ·, F} if M is an
importer,
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} CFF {CM , CF , ·, F} if M is an exporter. Not {CM , CF , ·, ·},
{·, ·,M, F}, {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]}: these can only be obtained by a coalition including either CM
and F , or M and F ; however it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} F {CM , CF , ·, ·}, {CM , CF ,M, F} CM
{·, ·,M, F} , {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]}, and {CM , CF ,M, F} F {·, ·,M, F} , {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]} if F
is the importer in the bloc formed byM and F ,
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {·, ·,M, F} , {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]}
if M is the importer. Not
{
CM , ·,M, ·}, {·, CF , ·, F}, or {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}: these can only be
obtained by a coalition including either F , or both CM and M ; however it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} F{
CM , ·,M, ·}, {CM , CF ,M, F} CFF {·, CF , ·, F} ,{[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}, and {CM , CF ,M, F} M
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{O} if CFF is an exporter, {CM , CF ,M, F} CM {O} if CFF is an importer. Not {CM , ·, ·, F},{·, CF ,M, ·}, or {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}: these can only be obtained by a coalition including ei-
ther CM and F , or M and F ; however it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} F {·, CF ,M, ·}, and either{
CM , CF ,M, F
} CM {CM , ·, ·, F} ,{[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}, or {CM , CF ,M, F} F {CM , ·, ·, F} ,{[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}.
To see the latter point, note that CM is worse off if the price goes down, while F is worse off if
it goes up (and, given it is an importer at this higher price, it must have been an importer even
before). Furthermore, it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {CM , ·, ·, F}, and either {CM , CF ,M, F} M{[
CM , F
]
,
[
CF ,M
]}
, or
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} F {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}. To see the latter point,
note that, for one of M and F , the price must go up (and, given it is an importer at this higher
price, it must have been an importer even before). 
Proof to Lemma 3. Preliminaries. Given S = E, there are two independent players:
M and F . Given that µ is large, it must be optimal for M to set TC
M
= ΠC
M
(τ) if T = 1 and
CM and M trade with each other, TC
M
= 0 otherwise. It must also be optimal for F to set
TC
F
= ΠC
F
(τ) if CF and F trade with each other, TC
F
= 0 otherwise. Then, M ’s payoff can
be written as vC
MM
[
pC
MM (τ)
]
if CM and M trade with each other, as vM
[
pM (τ)
]
otherwise;
and F ’s payoff as vC
FF
[
pC
FF (τ)
]
if CF and F trade with each other, as vF
[
pF (τ)
]
otherwise.
The proof proceeds in two steps, and various sub-steps. Step 1.1. If T = 1, no out-
come other than {CM , CF ,M, F} may be realised in a CPNE. Not {CM , ·,M, F}, since,
as shown earlier in this Appendix, it is vC
FF
(
pC
FF
{CM ,CF ,M,F}
)
> vF
(
pF{CM ,·,M,F}
)
. Since F can
single-handedly obtain
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
, there is a viable deviating coalition. Not {·, CF ,M, F},
since, as shown earlier in this Appendix, it is vC
MM
(
pC
MM
{CM ,CF ,M,F}
)
> vM
(
pM{·,CM ,M,F}
)
; and
M can single-handedly obtain this outcome. Not
{
CM , CF ,M, ·}, since {CM , CF ,M, F} F{
CM , CF ,M, ·}, and F can single-handedly obtain this outcome. Not {CM , CF , ·, F}, since{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {CM , CF , ·, F}, and M can single-handedly obtain this outcome. Not{
CM , CF , ·, ·}, since {CM , CF ,M, ·} M {CM , CF , ·, ·}, and M can single-handedly obtain this
outcome. Not {·, ·,M, F} and {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]}, since it is either {CM , ·,M, F} M {O} (if
M is an importer) or
{·, CF ,M, F} F {O} (if F is an importer); and M (F ) can single-handedly
obtain these outcomes. Not
{
CM , ·,M, ·} or {·, CF , ·, F}, since {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} CFF{
CM , ·,M, ·} and {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} M {·, CF , ·, F}, and F (M) can single-handedly obtain
this outcome. Not
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
, since
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} CMM {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}
and
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} CFF {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}, andM and F can jointly obtain {CM , CF ,M, F}.
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Not
{
CM , ·, ·, F}, {·, CF ,M, ·}, since {CM , ·,M, F} M {CM , ·, ·, F} and {·, CF ,M, F} F{·, CF ,M, ·}, and M (F ) can single-handedly obtain these outcomes. Not {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]},
since either
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} F {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]} (if F faces a higher price after the de-
viation) or
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]} (if M faces a higher price), and F (M)
can single-handedly obtain this outcome. Step 1.2. If T = 0, and δ < (1 + θ) /3, no out-
come other than {CM , CF ,M, F} may be realised in a CPNE. Not {·, CF ,M, F}, since{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {·, CF ,M, F} for δ ∈ [0, (1 + θ) /3), and M can single-handedly obtain this
outcome. To see the former point, note that, given δ < 2/3, M is an importer in
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
;
but, for δ ∈ [0, (1 + θ) /3), it is also an importer in {·, CF ,M, F}, since CFF is an exporter in{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
, and thus necessarily also in
{·, CF ,M, F} (implying that M is an importer):
but it is pM{CM ,CF ,M,F} ≤ pM{·,CF ,M,F}, implying the result. Not
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
, since it is{
CM , CF ,M, F
}  {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} and {CM , CF ,M, F} CFF {O}, and M and F can
jointly obtain this outcome. Not any other outcome, for the same reason presented at Step 1.1.
Step 1.3. If T = 0, and δ ∈ [(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]), only {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}
may be realised in a CPNE. Not
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
, since
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} M {CM , CF ,M, F}
for δ ∈ [(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]), and M can single-handedly obtain this outcome. Not
{·, CF ,M, F}, since {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} M {·, CF ,M, F} for δ ∈ [(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]),
and M can single-handedly obtain this outcome. Not any other outcome, for the same reason
presented at Step 1.1. Step 1.4. If T = 0, and and δ > 1 − 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)], only{·, CF ,M, F} may be realised in a CPNE. Not {CM , CF ,M, F}, since {·, CF ,M, F} M{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
for δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1], and M can single-handedly obtain this out-
come. Not
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
, since
{·, CF ,M, F} M {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} and {·, CF ,M, F} CFF{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
, and M and F can jointly obtain this outcome. Not any other outcome,
for the same reason presented at Step 1.1. Step 2.1. If T = 1, {CM , CF ,M, F} may
be realised in a CPNE. To see this, suppose τJI = 1 ∀I, J , so that
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
is re-
alised. No other outcome can be obtained by a viable coalition. Not
{
CM , ·,M, F}: this can
only be obtained by a coalition including F ; however, as shown earlier in this Appendix, it is
vC
FF
(
pC
FF
{CM ,CF ,M,F}
)
> vF
(
pF{CM ,·,M,F}
)
. Not {·, CF ,M, F}: this can only be obtained by a
coalition including M ; however, as shown earlier in this Appendix, it is vC
MM
(
pC
MM
{CM ,CF ,M,F}
)
>
vM
(
pM{·,CF ,M,F}
)
. Not
{
CM , CF ,M, ·}: this can only be achieved by a coalition including F , how-
ever it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} F {CM , CF ,M, ·}. Not {CM , CF , ·, F}: this can only be obtained by
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a coalition including M , however it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {CM , CF , ·, F}. Not {CM , CF , ·, ·},
{·, ·,M, F}, {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]}: these can only be obtained by a coalition including M and F ,
however there exists J ∈ {M,F} which is an importer in {O}, and {CM , CF ,M, F} J {O}. Not{
CM , ·,M, ·}, {·, CF , ·, F}, or {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}: these can only be obtained by a coalition
including either F or M , however it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} CFF {O} and {CM , CF ,M, F} CMM
{O}. Not {CM , ·, ·, F}, {·, CF ,M, ·}, or {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}: these can only be obtained by a
coalition including both M and F ; however, in the first two outcomes, there exists J ∈ {M,F}
which is in autarky after the deviation. In the third outcome, there exists J ∈ {M,F} which
imports and faces a higher price after the deviation. Since J is an importer after the devia-
tion, it is also an importer when facing a lower price before the deviation. In both cases, it is{
CM , CF ,M, F
} J {O}. Step 2.2. If T = 0 and δ < (1 + θ) /3, {CM , CF ,M, F} may
be realised in a CPNE. To see this, suppose τJI = 1 ∀I, J , so that
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
is re-
alised. No other outcome can be obtained by a viable coalition. Not {·, CF ,M, F}: this can
only be obtained by a coalition including M ; however it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {·, CF ,M, F}
for δ ∈ [0, (1 + θ) /3). Not {CM , ·,M, ·}, {·, CF , ·, F}, or {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}: these can only
be obtained by a coalition including either F or M , however it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {O}
for δ ∈ [0, (1 + θ) /3). Not any other outcome, for the same reasons presented at Step 2.1.
Step 2.3. If T = 0 and δ ∈ [(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]), {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} may
be realised in a CPNE (with the exception of a subregion of θ ∈ [0.000, 0.030) and
δ ∈ (0.746, 0.750)). To see this, suppose τJI = 1 ∀I, J , except τCMCF = τC
M
F = τ
M
CF = τ
M
F = 0.
No other outcome can be obtained by a viable coalition. Not
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
: this can only be
achieved by a coalition including M , however it is
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} M {CM , CF ,M, F}
for δ ∈ [(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]). Not {CM , ·,M, F}: this can only be obtained by
a coalition including both M and F , however
{
CM , ·,M, F} M {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} re-
quires δ ≥ 1 − 1/ [(3− θ) (2− θ)] ≥ 1/2, which can never be true for θ ≤ 1/2 (since it is
1−1/ [(3− θ) (2− θ)] ≥ 1−1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] in this case); furthermore, if θ > 1/2 and δ > 1/2 it
is vF
(
pF{[CM ,M ],[CF ,F ]}
)
> vC
FF
(
pC
FF
{CM ,·,M,F}
)
.60 Not {·, CF ,M, F}: this can only be obtained by
60We can write vC
FF
(
pC
FF
{[CM ,M ],[CF ,F ]}
)
− vF
(
pF{CM ,·,M,F}
)
=
√
δ
√
1+θ
3−θ − 12(3−θ) − δ2 ≡ A. It is A > 0 for
δ ∈ [1/2, 1] and θ ∈ [1/2, 1). It is easy to show that A > 0 for δ = 1/2 and θ = 1/2, and ∂A/∂θ > 0 for δ = 1/2:
this implies A > 0 for δ = 1/2. Furthermore, it is A > 0 for δ = 1 and θ = 1/2, and ∂A/∂δ > 0 for δ = 1/2,
θ = 1/2, ∂2A/∂δ2 < 0: this implies A > 0 for θ = 1/2. Finally, it is ∂2A/∂δ∂θ > 0, which together with facts
stated earlier implies A > 0 for δ ∈ [1/2, 1] and θ ∈ [1/2, 1).
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a coalition including both M and F , however it is
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} M {·, CF ,M, F} for δ ∈
[(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]). Not {CM , CF ,M, ·}: this can only be achieved by a coali-
tion including F , however it is
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} F {CM , CF ,M, ·}. Not {CM , CF , ·, F}:
this can only be obtained by a coalition including M , however it is
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} M{
CM , CF , ·, F}. Not {CM , CF , ·, ·}: this can only be obtained by a coalition including both M
and F , however it is
{[
CM ,M
] [
CF , F
]} M {CM , CF , ·, ·}. Not {·, ·,M, F}, {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]},
except for a subregion of θ ∈ [0.000, 0.030) and δ ∈ (0.746, 0.750): these can only be ob-
tained by a coalition including both M and F ; however if δ < 1/2, M is an importer both
before and after the change, and the deviation gives it a higher price (since 1/2 ≤ δ/ (1 + θ)
or δ ≥ (1 + θ) /2 is implied by δ ≥ (1 + θ) /3). Then, it is {[CM ,M] [CF , F ]} M {O}. If
δ ≥ 1/2, M is an exporter after the change. By Result 1, it is {[CM ,M] [CF , F ]} M {O}
if δ < (3− 2θ) / (4− 2θ) < 1 − 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)], {O} F {[CM ,M] [CF , F ]} otherwise. It
can be shown that vC
FF
(
pC
FF
{[CM ,M ],[CF ,F ]}
)
> vF
(
pF{O}
)
for θ ≥ 0.030 and δ ∈ [0.500, 0.750],61
and it is (3− 2θ) / (4− 2θ) = 0.746 for θ = 0.030. Then, there are two cases. In a subregion
of θ ∈ [0.000, 0.030) and δ ∈ (0.746, 0.750), a coalition including M and F is viable, and the
equilibrium collapses. Outside of this range, such a coalition is not viable. Not
{
CM , ·,M, ·} or{·, CF , ·, F}: these can only be obtained by a coalition including F (M) in the first (second) case,
however
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} F {CM , ·,M, ·} and {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} M {·, CF , ·, F}.
Not
{
CM , ·, ·, F}, {·, CF ,M, ·}, or {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}: these can only be obtained by a
coalition including both M and F , however it is
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} M {CM , ·, ·, F} and{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} F {·, CF ,M, ·}; furthermore, if θ ≥ 1/2, F faces a higher price after
the change, and it is
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} F {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}, if θ < 1/2, M faces a
higher price after the change, and it is
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} M {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}. Step
2.4. If T = 0 and δ > 1 − 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)], {·, CF ,M, F} may be realised in a
CPNE. To see this, suppose τJI = 1 ∀I, J , except τCMCF = τC
M
M = τ
CM
F = 0. No other out-
come can be obtained by a viable coalition. Not
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
: this can only be obtained
by a coalition including M . however it is
{·, CF ,M, F} M {CM , CF ,M, F} (since M is an
exporter both before and after the change). Not
{
CM , ·,M, F}: this can only be obtained by
a coalition including both M and F , however it is either
{·, CF ,M, F} M {CM , ·,M, F} or
61One can write vC
FF
(
pC
FF
{[CM ,M ],[CF ,F ]}
)
− vF
(
pF{O}
)
=
√
δ
√
1 + θ − 1√
2
(1/2 + δ) ≡ A. Since ∂A/∂θ > 0, it
is sufficient to show that A > 0 for θ = 0.030 and δ ∈ [0.500, 0.750]. This is easy to verify, given A > 0 for both
δ = 0.500 and δ = 0.750, and ∂2A/∂δ2 < 0.
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{·, CF ,M, F} F {CM , ·,M, F} (since M remains an exporter after the change, while F re-
mains an importer). Not
{
CM , CF ,M, ·}: this can only be achieved by a coalition including
both M and F , however it is
{·, CF ,M, F} F {CM , CF ,M, ·}. Not {CM , CF , ·, F}: this can
only be obtained by a coalition including M , however it is
{·, CF ,M, F} M {CM , CF , ·, F}.
Not
{
CM , CF , ·, ·}, {·, ·,M, F}, {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]}: these can only be obtained by a coalition
including both M and F , however it is
{·, CF ,M, F} F {O} (in the case of the second and
third outcomes, this follows from the fact that F faces a higher price after the change, while
remaining an importer). Not
{
CM , ·,M, ·}, {·, CF , ·, F} and {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}: these can
only be obtained by a coalition including M , however it is
{·, CF ,M, F} M {O} (in the case
of the first and third outcome, it follows from the fact that δ ≥ 1 − 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]). Not{
CM , ·, ·, F}, {·, CF ,M, ·}, or {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}: these can only be obtained by a coalition
including F , however it is
{·, CF ,M, F} F {O} (in the case of the first and third outcome, this
follows from the fact that F faces a higher price after the change, while remaining an importer).

Proof to Proposition 1. If µ ≥ µT , suppose M sets S = E. By definition of µT , the
equilibrium is as described in Lemma 3. If T = 1, the trade outcome is the same as for S = I,
and M gets a positive transfer. If T = 0, the trade outcome is, for M ’s payoff, at least as good
as for S = I. Thus, it is optimal for M to set S = E. If µ < µT , suppose again that M sets
S = E. Now, M must worry about revolution, since, if equilibrium policy were as described in
Lemma 3, CM would stage a revolution. Note first that M ’s payoff is no greater for S = R than
for S = I.62 If T = 1, given a trade policy matrix τ , M ’s optimal choice of a transfer (condi-
tional on not triggering a revolution) must be TC
M
= ΠC
M
(τ) − ΠCM (R) − (1− θ) (B − µ) at
an outcome where CM and M trade with each other, and TC
M
= 0 otherwise. Using (10), M ’s
payoff can then be written as vC
MM
[
pC
MM (τ)
]
+ constant if CM and M trade with each other,
vM
[
pM (τ)
]
otherwise. Since M ’s payoff is, up to a constant, the same as under unconstrained
empire, and F ’s payoff is too, the trade policy equilibrium is as described in Lemma 3. Note
62If δ < δ (θ), the trade outcome if S = R is
{·, CF ,M, F} or {·, ·,M, F} if δ ∈ [0, 1/4), {·, CF ,M, F} if
δ ∈ [1/4, δ (θ)) (see the proof to Lemma 1). But it is {CM , CF ,M, F} M {·, ·,M, F} if δ ∈ [0, 1/4), since M is
an importer in both outcomes (and the price is lower in the former); and it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {·, CF ,M, F},
since δ < δ (θ) implies δ < (1 + θ) /3, which in turn implies that, again, M is an importer in both outcomes (and
the price is lower in the former). If δ ∈ [δ (θ) , 2/3), the trade outcome if S = R is {CM , CF , ·, F}; but it is{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {CM , CF , ·, F}; finally, if δ ∈ [2/3, 1], the trade outcome if S = R is {CM , CF ,M, F}, the
same as if S = I.
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that it is TC
M
> 0 for µ ∈ [µ, µ1), TCM < 0 for µ < µ. If T = 0, I proceed in four steps.
Step 1. µ ∈ [µ, µ0), the outcome that realises under unconstrained empire cannot
realise in a CPNE. To see this, note that
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
cannot be realised if δ ∈
[(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]), since {CM , CF ,M, F} M {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} (since the
latter trigger a revolution) andM can single handedly obtain this outcome; and, by a similar logic,{·, CF ,M, F} cannot be realised if δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1]. Step 2. {CM , CF ,M, F}
if δ ∈ [(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]), and {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} and {CM , CF ,M, F} if
δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1], are the unique outcomes which, 1) give CM a payoff
higher than under unconstrained empire; 2) give M a payoff at least as high as
for S = I; 3) and do not prompt a deviation by F . If δ ∈ [0, (1 + θ) /3], five outcomes
may give CM a payoff higher than under unconstrained empire:
{
CM , ·,M, F}, {CM , ·,M, ·},{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
,
{
CM , ·, ·, F}, {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}. However as shown in the proof to
Lemma 3 (Step 1.2), F can profitably deviate from the first, second and fifth outcome. As
for third and fourth, it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {O}. If δ ∈ [(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]),
five outcomes may give CM a payoff higher than under unconstrained empire:
{
CM , ·,M, F},{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
,
{
CM , ·, ·, F}, {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}, and {CM , CF , ·, F}. However as shown
in the proof to Lemma 3 (Step 1.3), F can profitably deviate from the first outcome, as well
as the fourth if the price is higher in the first bloc. As for the third outcome, the fourth
if the price is higher in the second bloc, and the fifth, it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {O}. Fi-
nally, if δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1], eight outcomes may give CM a payoff higher than un-
der unconstrained empire:
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
,
{
CM , ·,M, F}, {CM , CF ,M, ·}, {CM , CF , ·, F},{
CM , ·, ·, F}, {CM , ·,M, ·}, {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} and {[CM , F ] , [CF ,M]}. However as shown
in the proof to Lemma 3 (Step 1.4), F can profitably deviate from the second, third, sixth,
and eighth outcome. As for the fourth and fifth, it is
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M {O}. Note that it is{
CM , CF ,M, F
} CM {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}. Instead, by Result 1, it is {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} M{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
for δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1− 1/ [3 (2− θ)]), and {CM , CF ,M, F} M{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
for δ ∈ [1− 1/ [3 (2− θ)] , 1]. Step 3.1. If µ ∈ [µ, µ0] and δ ∈
[(1 + θ) /3, 1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)]), {CM , CF ,M, F} can be realised in a CPNE. This can
be shown using the proof to Lemma 3 (Step 2.1) except that the reasons why it is not profitable
for M to deviate to {·, CF ,M, F} and {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]} is that these outcomes lead to revo-
lution. Step 3.2. If µ ∈ [µ, µ0] and δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1), one of {CM , CF ,M, F}
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and
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
can be realised in a CPNE, except in a subregion of θ ∈
[0.000, 0.190) and δ ∈ (0.803, 0.833). If δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1− 1/ [3 (2− θ)]) and µ ∈[
µ,B +
[
ΠC
M
(R)− vCM
(
pC
M
{[CM ,M ],[CF ,F ]}
)]
/ (1− θ)
)
, or if δ ∈ [1− 1/ [3 (2− θ)] , 1], {CM , CF ,M, F}
can be realised in a CPNE. This can be shown as in Step 3.1, except that, if δ ∈ [1− 1/ [3 (2− θ)] , 1],
the reason why it is not profitable forM to deviate to
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
is that
{
CM , CF ,M, F
} M{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
. If δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1− 1/ [3 (2− θ)]) and µ ∈
[
B +
[
ΠC
M
(R)− vCM
(
pC
M
{[CM ,M ],[CF ,F ]}
)]
/ (1− θ) , µ0
)
,{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]}
can be realised in a CPNE. This can be shown using the proof to Lemma
3, Step 2.3, except that the reasons why it is not profitable for M to deviate to
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
is
that it is
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} M {CM , CF ,M, F} for δ ∈ [1− 1/ [(2 + θ) (2− θ)] , 1− 1/ [3 (2− θ)]];
the reason why it is not profitable for M to deviate to
{
CF , ·,M, F} is that it leads to revolution
(and to {CM , CF ,M, F}, which is worse for M than {[CM ,M] , [CF , F ]}); the reason why it is
not profitable for M to deviate to {·, ·,M, F} and {[CM , CF ] , [M,F ]} is that they lead to revo-
lution; and that there is a viable deviation to
{
CM , ·,M, F} in a subregion of θ ∈ [0.000, 0.190)
and δ ∈ (0.803, 0.833). This outcome can only be obtained by a coalition including both M and
F ; however using Result 1, one finds that it is
{[
CM ,M
]
,
[
CF , F
]} M {CM , ·,M, F} iff δ ≥
1−1/ [(3− θ) (2− θ)] < 1−1/ [3 (2− θ)] (with both thresholds increasing in θ). It can be shown
that vC
FF
(
pC
FF
{[CM ,M ],[CF ,F ]}
)
> vF
(
pF{{}}
)
for θ ≥ 0.190, and it is 1− 1/ [(3− θ) (2− θ)] = 0.803
for θ = 0.190, and 1− 1/ [3 (2− θ)] = 5/6 = 0.833 for θ = 0. In a subregion of θ ∈ [0.000, 0.190)
and δ ∈ (0.803, 0.833), a coalition including M and F is viable, and the equilibrium collapses.
Step 4. If µ < µ, in any CPNE, either the outcome that realises is such that
M has a lower payoff than for S = I, or it is such that CM stages a revolution.
If
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
realises, by definition of µ, condition 12 holds. If any other outcome re-
alises, if it gives M a higher a payoff than
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
, it must lead to revolution (since{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
, the best such outcome from CM ’s perspective, does.) In summary, if µ < µ,
and T = 0, the equilibrium outcome is {CM , CF ,M, F}, and the maximum transfer that M can
impose (conditional on not triggering a revolution) is negative; if T = 0, the equilibrium outcome
is either one that makes M worse off than
{
CM , CF ,M, F
}
, or one that leads to revolution. This
discussion implies that M sticks to empire if µ ∈ [µ, µT ], concedes independence if µ < µ. 
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